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The myths of Tet : the most misunderstood event of the Vietnam War / Edwin E. Moise.

By: Moïse, Edwin E, 1946- [author.].
Material type: TextTextSeries: JSTOR eBooks.Modern war studies: Publisher: Lawrence, KS : University Press of Kansas, [2017]Description: 1 online resource.ISBN: 9780700625031; 0700625038.Additional physical formats: Print version:: No titleDDC classification: 959.704/34 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook. Summary: "Most of those who study and write about the Vietnam War now agree that the Tet Offensive was militarily a defeat for the Communist forces, since those forces failed to take the cities but suffered very heavy casualties in the attempt. Yet it was a victory for them politically, because it undermined support for the war in the United States. So stated, the conventional wisdom is well founded. Edwin Moise takes the controversies surrounding Tet head on, exposing the errors and misrepresentations in some of the Tet accounts and demonstrating that much of the conventional wisdom is astonishingly inaccurate."--Provided by publisher.
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Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
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DS557.8.T4 M65 2017 (Browse shelf) https://ezproxy.uttyler.edu/login?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1x07zgd Available on1012343035

"Most of those who study and write about the Vietnam War now agree that the Tet Offensive was militarily a defeat for the Communist forces, since those forces failed to take the cities but suffered very heavy casualties in the attempt. Yet it was a victory for them politically, because it undermined support for the war in the United States. So stated, the conventional wisdom is well founded. Edwin Moise takes the controversies surrounding Tet head on, exposing the errors and misrepresentations in some of the Tet accounts and demonstrating that much of the conventional wisdom is astonishingly inaccurate."--Provided by publisher.

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CHOICE Review

Students and scholars of the Vietnam War know Clemson historian Moïse for his work on the Tonkin Gulf incident, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (CH, May'97, 34-5291), and his comprehensive online Vietnam War Bibliography (CH, Sup'06, 43Sup-0600), on various aspects of Vietnam. In this book, Moïse seeks to correct misconceptions and misinterpretations of the 1968 Tet Offensive, including that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks were well coordinated; that communist infrastructure in South Vietnam was destroyed; that the offensive was brief; and that combat intensity subsequently dropped. Moïse counters these and other myths of Tet mainly through quantitative means. He uses most of the book to demystify the controversial order of battle figures before, during, and after Tet through exhaustively reconciling conflicting reports of numbers of enemy forces at all levels. Moïse is the master of this material, but his presentation will test those expecting a more engaging approach. He offers the most persuasive argument that analysts at MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) purposefully underestimated the strength of enemy units due to pressure from their military and political superiors, rather than from the evidence at hand. Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, faculty; research libraries. --William Thomas Allison, Georgia Southern University

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