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No exit : America and the German problem, 1943-1954 / James McAllister.

By: McAllister, James, 1964-.
Material type: TextTextSeries: Cornell studies in security affairs: Publisher: Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 2002Description: viii, 283 pages ; 25 cm.Content type: text Media type: unmediated Carrier type: volumeISBN: 0801438764; 9780801438769.Subject(s): World War (1939-1945) | Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft | German reunification question (1949-1990) | United States -- Foreign relations -- Germany | Germany -- Foreign relations -- United States | United States -- Foreign relations -- Europe | Europe -- Foreign relations -- United States | United States -- Foreign relations -- 1945-1953 | Germany -- Politics and government -- 1945-1990 | German reunification question (1949-1990) | World War, 1939-1945 -- Influence | Balance of power -- History -- 20th century | Balance of power | Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) | Diplomatic relations | Politics and government | Europe | Germany | United States | Koude Oorlog | Militaire politiek | EDG | Bezettingen | Außenpolitik | Deutsche Frage | USA | États-Unis -- Relations extérieures -- Allemagne -- 1945-1970 | Allemagne -- Relations extérieures -- États-Unis -- 1945-1970 | États-Unis -- Relations extérieures -- Europe de l'Ouest -- 1945-1970 | Europe de l'Ouest -- Relations extérieures -- États-Unis -- 1945-1970 | Sicherheitspolitik | USA | 1900-1999 | Geschichte 1943-1954Genre/Form: History.DDC classification: 327.73043/09/044 Other classification: 15.50 | ML 6200 | NQ 5985 | 8,1 | u 173 | x 499.1 | 327.73043
Contents:
America, the German problem, and the bipolar revolution -- Wartime diplomacy and postwar plans -- One German problem or two? -- Years of danger and opportunity: the restoration of a European balance of power -- Temporary and permanent solutions: German rearmament and the European defense community -- No exit: America and the future of Europe.
Review: "James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure of power, the continuing importance of the German question, and American efforts to create a united Western Europe. Challenging the conventional wisdom among both international relations theorists and Cold War historians, McAllister argues that America's central objective from the Second World War to the mid-1950s was to create a European order that could be peaceful and stable without requiring that American ground forces remain on the continent."--Jacket.
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Book University of Texas At Tyler
Stacks - 3rd Floor 		E183.8.G3 M35 2002 (Browse shelf) Available 0000002330140

Includes bibliographical references (pages 265-269) and index.

America, the German problem, and the bipolar revolution -- Wartime diplomacy and postwar plans -- One German problem or two? -- Years of danger and opportunity: the restoration of a European balance of power -- Temporary and permanent solutions: German rearmament and the European defense community -- No exit: America and the future of Europe.

"James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure of power, the continuing importance of the German question, and American efforts to create a united Western Europe. Challenging the conventional wisdom among both international relations theorists and Cold War historians, McAllister argues that America's central objective from the Second World War to the mid-1950s was to create a European order that could be peaceful and stable without requiring that American ground forces remain on the continent."--Jacket.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

McAllister (political science, Williams College) sets out to prove that the US wanted to shape a post-WW II European power structure that could maintain peace without US military forces. Constructing such an arrangement was delicate, with a need to balance not just US interests, but specific French, British, Soviet, German, and European interests as well. McAllister examines the works of prominent political scientists, historians, and practicing diplomats. Sometimes the details are heavy, and the synthesis hard to find, but, on balance, this book is a useful interpretation of the problems that plagued Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower as the US fruitlessly sought ways to disengage from Europe after the war. McAllister compares political science's theoretical model of bipolarity with historical perceptions from the German-centered case and concludes that historical evidence is more valuable. Reparations issues and their impact on the ultimate division of Germany are examined at length. And the importance of supranational European institutions is treated in the context of making European peace sustainable in the absence of US military forces. McAllister argues repeatedly that the US had no desire for an empire; Americans simply wanted to go home. But the telling point comes when the author suggests that the US had an "Empire by Default." Upper-division undergraduates and above. D. A. Browder Austin Peay State University

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