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Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (in)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes.

By: Felsenthal, Dan S.
Contributor(s): Nurmi, Hannu.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.SpringerBriefs in Economics Ser: Publisher: Cham : Springer, 2018Copyright date: ©2018Description: 1 online resource (147 pages).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783319740331.Subject(s): Voting-Social aspectsGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (in)Vulnerability to Various Voting ParadoxesDDC classification: 324.6 LOC classification: HB846-HB846.8JF1001-Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Intro -- Preface -- References -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- Abstract -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 2 Voting Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 2.1 Simple Paradoxes -- 2.1.1 The Condorcet Winner Paradox (Condorcet de 1785 -- Black 1958) -- 2.1.2 The Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 2.1.3 The Condorcet Loser or Borda Paradox (Borda de 1784 -- Black 1958) -- 2.1.4 The Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 2.1.5 The Pareto (or Dominated Candidate) Paradox (Fishburn 1974) -- 2.2 Conditional Paradoxes -- 2.2.1 Additional Support (or Lack of Monotonicity or Negative Responsiveness) Paradox (Smith 1973 -- Fishburn 1974a -- Fishburn and Brams 1983) -- 2.2.2 Reinforcement (or Inconsistency or Multiple Districts) Paradox (Young 1974) -- 2.2.3 Truncation Paradox (Brams 1982 -- Fishburn and Brams 1983) -- 2.2.4 No-Show Paradox (Fishburn and Brams 1983 -- Ray 1986 -- Moulin 1988b -- Holzman 1988/1989 -- Perez 1995) -- 2.2.5 Twin Paradox (Moulin 1988b) -- 2.2.6 Violation of the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) (Fishburn 1974b, c -- 1977) -- 2.2.7 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 2.2.8 Dependence on Order of Voting (DOV) Paradox (Farquharson 1969) -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 3 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- Abstract -- 3.1 Non-Ranked Voting Procedures -- 3.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 3.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 3.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983) -- 3.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson 1969) -- 3.2 Ranked Voting Procedures that are not Condorcet-Consistent -- 3.2.1 Borda's Count (Borda 1784 -- Black 1958) -- 3.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 3.2.3 Coombs' Method (Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Straffin 1980 -- Coombs et al. 1984) -- 3.2.4 Bucklin's Method (Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491.
Tideman 2006, p. 203) -- 3.2.5 Range Voting (Smith 2000) -- 3.2.6 Majority Judgment (Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2011) -- 3.3 Ranked Voting Procedures that are Condorcet-Consistent -- 3.3.1 The Minimax Procedure -- 3.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean and Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 3.3.3 Nanson's Method (Nanson 1883 -- McLean and Urken 1995, Ch. 14) -- 3.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951) -- 3.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66) -- 3.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959 -- Kemeny and Snell 1960 -- Young and Levenglick 1978 -- Young 1988, 1995) -- 3.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986) -- 3.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977) -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 4 The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 4.1 The (In)Vulnerability of the Plurality Voting Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 4.1.1 The Condorcet Winner, the Condorcet Loser, the Absolute Majority Loser, the Preference Inversion, and the SCC Paradoxes -- 4.1.1.1 Example -- 4.1.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 4.1.3 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 4.1.4 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 4.1.5 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.1.6 No-Show Paradox -- 4.1.7 Truncation Paradox -- 4.1.8 Twin Paradox -- 4.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Plurality with Runoff Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 4.2.1 The Condorcet Winner, Lack of Monotonicity, and the SCC Paradoxes -- 4.2.1.1 Example -- 4.2.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 4.2.3 Condorcet Loser and Absolute Majority Paradoxes -- 4.2.4 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 4.2.5 Truncation Paradox -- 4.2.6 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.2.6.1 Example -- 4.2.7 No Show and Twin Paradoxes -- 4.2.7.1 Example -- 4.2.8 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 4.2.8.1 Example -- 4.3 The (In)Vulnerability of the Approval Voting Procedure to Various Paradoxes.
4.3.1 The Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 4.3.1.1 Example -- 4.3.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 4.3.2.1 Example -- 4.3.3 Condorcet Loser, Absolute Majority Loser, and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 4.3.3.1 Example -- 4.3.4 The Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 4.3.4.1 Example -- 4.3.5 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 4.3.6 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.3.7 No-Show Paradox -- 4.3.8 Twin Paradox -- 4.3.9 Truncation Paradox -- 4.3.9.1 Example -- 4.3.10 Remark -- 4.3.11 The SCC Paradox -- 4.4 The (In)Vulnerability of the Successive Elimination Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 4.4.1 Absolute Majority Winner and Condorcet Winner Paradoxes -- 4.4.2 Absolute Majority Loser and Condorcet Loser Paradoxes -- 4.4.3 Pareto-Dominated Candidate, SCC, No-Show, and Dependence on Order of Voting (DOV) Paradoxes -- 4.4.3.1 Example -- 4.4.4 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 4.4.5 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.4.5.1 Example -- 4.4.6 Twin Paradox -- 4.4.6.1 Example -- 4.4.7 Truncation Paradox -- 4.4.7.1 Example -- 4.4.8 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 4.4.8.1 Example -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 5 The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 5.1 The (In)Vulnerability of Borda's Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.1.1 The Condorcet Winner and the Absolute Majority Winner Paradoxes -- 5.1.1.1 Example -- 5.1.2 Condorcet Loser Paradox -- 5.1.3 Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 5.1.4 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.1.5 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.1.6 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.1.7 No-Show Paradox -- 5.1.8 Twin Paradox -- 5.1.9 Truncation and SCC Paradoxes -- 5.1.9.1 Example -- 5.1.9.2 Example -- 5.1.10 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Alternative Vote Procedure to Various Paradoxes.
5.2.1 Condorcet Winner, Lack of Monotonicity, Reinforcement, No-Show, Twin, Preference Inversion, and SCC Paradoxes -- 5.2.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 5.2.3 Absolute Majority Loser, Condorcet Loser, and Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradoxes -- 5.2.4 Truncation Paradox -- 5.2.4.1 Example -- 5.2.5 Remark -- 5.2.5.1 Example -- 5.3 The (In)Vulnerability of Coombs' Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.3.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 5.3.1.1 Example -- 5.3.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 5.3.3 Absolute Majority Loser, Condorcet Loser, and Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradoxes -- 5.3.4 Remark -- 5.3.4.1 Example -- 5.3.5 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.3.6 No-Show, Truncation, and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 5.3.6.1 Example -- 5.3.7 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.3.7.1 Example -- 5.3.8 Twin Paradox -- 5.3.8.1 Example -- 5.3.9 SCC Paradox -- 5.3.9.1 Example -- 5.4 The (In)Vulnerability of Bucklin's Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.4.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 5.4.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 5.4.3 Condorcet Loser Paradox -- 5.4.3.1 Example -- 5.4.4 Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 5.4.5 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.4.6 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.4.7 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.4.7.1 Example -- 5.4.8 No-Show, Twin, Truncation, and SCC Paradoxes -- 5.4.8.1 Example -- 5.4.9 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.4.9.1 Example -- 5.5 The (In)Vulnerability of the Range Voting (RV) Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.5.1 Condorcet Winner, Absolute Majority Winner, Condorcet Loser, and Absolute Majority Loser Paradoxes -- 5.5.1.1 Example -- 5.5.2 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.5.3 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.5.4 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.5.5 No-Show Paradox -- 5.5.6 Twin Paradox -- 5.5.7 Truncation Paradox -- 5.5.7.1 Example -- 5.5.8 The SCC Paradox -- 5.5.9 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.5.9.1 Example.
5.6 The (In)Vulnerability of the Majority Judgment (MJ) Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.6.1 Condorcet Winner, Absolute Majority Winner, Condorcet Loser, and Absolute Majority Loser Paradoxes -- 5.6.1.1 Example -- 5.6.2 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.6.3 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.6.4 The Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.6.4.1 Example -- 5.6.5 The No-Show and Twin Paradoxes -- 5.6.5.1 Example -- 5.6.6 Truncation Paradox -- 5.6.6.1 Example -- 5.6.7 The SCC Paradox -- 5.6.8 The Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.6.8.1 Example -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 6 The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 6.1 The (In)Vulnerability of the Minimax Procedure (aka Simpson-Kramer or Condorcet's Procedure) to Various Paradoxes -- 6.1.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 6.1.2 Condorcet Loser, Absolute Majority Loser and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 6.1.2.1 Example -- 6.1.3 The SCC Paradox -- 6.1.3.1 Example -- 6.1.4 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 6.1.5 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 6.1.6 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 6.1.7 Reinforcement Paradox -- 6.1.7.1 Example -- 6.1.8 No-Show and Twin Paradoxes -- 6.1.8.1 Example -- 6.1.9 Truncation Paradox -- 6.1.9.1 Example -- 6.2 The (In)Vulnerability of Dodgson's Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 6.2.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 6.2.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 6.2.3 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 6.2.4 The Condorcet Loser and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 6.2.4.1 Example -- 6.2.5 The Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 6.2.5.1 Example -- 6.2.6 Lack of Monotonicity, No-Show, Twin and SCC Paradoxes -- 6.2.6.1 Example -- 6.2.7 Reinforcement -- 6.2.7.1 Example -- 6.2.8 Truncation Paradox -- 6.2.8.1 Example -- 6.3 The (In)Vulnerability of Nanson's Procedure to Various Paradoxes.
6.3.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox.
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Intro -- Preface -- References -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- Abstract -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 2 Voting Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 2.1 Simple Paradoxes -- 2.1.1 The Condorcet Winner Paradox (Condorcet de 1785 -- Black 1958) -- 2.1.2 The Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 2.1.3 The Condorcet Loser or Borda Paradox (Borda de 1784 -- Black 1958) -- 2.1.4 The Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 2.1.5 The Pareto (or Dominated Candidate) Paradox (Fishburn 1974) -- 2.2 Conditional Paradoxes -- 2.2.1 Additional Support (or Lack of Monotonicity or Negative Responsiveness) Paradox (Smith 1973 -- Fishburn 1974a -- Fishburn and Brams 1983) -- 2.2.2 Reinforcement (or Inconsistency or Multiple Districts) Paradox (Young 1974) -- 2.2.3 Truncation Paradox (Brams 1982 -- Fishburn and Brams 1983) -- 2.2.4 No-Show Paradox (Fishburn and Brams 1983 -- Ray 1986 -- Moulin 1988b -- Holzman 1988/1989 -- Perez 1995) -- 2.2.5 Twin Paradox (Moulin 1988b) -- 2.2.6 Violation of the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) (Fishburn 1974b, c -- 1977) -- 2.2.7 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 2.2.8 Dependence on Order of Voting (DOV) Paradox (Farquharson 1969) -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 3 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- Abstract -- 3.1 Non-Ranked Voting Procedures -- 3.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 3.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 3.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983) -- 3.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson 1969) -- 3.2 Ranked Voting Procedures that are not Condorcet-Consistent -- 3.2.1 Borda's Count (Borda 1784 -- Black 1958) -- 3.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 3.2.3 Coombs' Method (Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Straffin 1980 -- Coombs et al. 1984) -- 3.2.4 Bucklin's Method (Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491.

Tideman 2006, p. 203) -- 3.2.5 Range Voting (Smith 2000) -- 3.2.6 Majority Judgment (Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2011) -- 3.3 Ranked Voting Procedures that are Condorcet-Consistent -- 3.3.1 The Minimax Procedure -- 3.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean and Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 3.3.3 Nanson's Method (Nanson 1883 -- McLean and Urken 1995, Ch. 14) -- 3.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951) -- 3.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66) -- 3.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959 -- Kemeny and Snell 1960 -- Young and Levenglick 1978 -- Young 1988, 1995) -- 3.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986) -- 3.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977) -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 4 The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 4.1 The (In)Vulnerability of the Plurality Voting Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 4.1.1 The Condorcet Winner, the Condorcet Loser, the Absolute Majority Loser, the Preference Inversion, and the SCC Paradoxes -- 4.1.1.1 Example -- 4.1.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 4.1.3 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 4.1.4 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 4.1.5 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.1.6 No-Show Paradox -- 4.1.7 Truncation Paradox -- 4.1.8 Twin Paradox -- 4.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Plurality with Runoff Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 4.2.1 The Condorcet Winner, Lack of Monotonicity, and the SCC Paradoxes -- 4.2.1.1 Example -- 4.2.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 4.2.3 Condorcet Loser and Absolute Majority Paradoxes -- 4.2.4 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 4.2.5 Truncation Paradox -- 4.2.6 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.2.6.1 Example -- 4.2.7 No Show and Twin Paradoxes -- 4.2.7.1 Example -- 4.2.8 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 4.2.8.1 Example -- 4.3 The (In)Vulnerability of the Approval Voting Procedure to Various Paradoxes.

4.3.1 The Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 4.3.1.1 Example -- 4.3.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 4.3.2.1 Example -- 4.3.3 Condorcet Loser, Absolute Majority Loser, and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 4.3.3.1 Example -- 4.3.4 The Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 4.3.4.1 Example -- 4.3.5 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 4.3.6 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.3.7 No-Show Paradox -- 4.3.8 Twin Paradox -- 4.3.9 Truncation Paradox -- 4.3.9.1 Example -- 4.3.10 Remark -- 4.3.11 The SCC Paradox -- 4.4 The (In)Vulnerability of the Successive Elimination Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 4.4.1 Absolute Majority Winner and Condorcet Winner Paradoxes -- 4.4.2 Absolute Majority Loser and Condorcet Loser Paradoxes -- 4.4.3 Pareto-Dominated Candidate, SCC, No-Show, and Dependence on Order of Voting (DOV) Paradoxes -- 4.4.3.1 Example -- 4.4.4 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 4.4.5 Reinforcement Paradox -- 4.4.5.1 Example -- 4.4.6 Twin Paradox -- 4.4.6.1 Example -- 4.4.7 Truncation Paradox -- 4.4.7.1 Example -- 4.4.8 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 4.4.8.1 Example -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 5 The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 5.1 The (In)Vulnerability of Borda's Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.1.1 The Condorcet Winner and the Absolute Majority Winner Paradoxes -- 5.1.1.1 Example -- 5.1.2 Condorcet Loser Paradox -- 5.1.3 Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 5.1.4 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.1.5 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.1.6 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.1.7 No-Show Paradox -- 5.1.8 Twin Paradox -- 5.1.9 Truncation and SCC Paradoxes -- 5.1.9.1 Example -- 5.1.9.2 Example -- 5.1.10 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Alternative Vote Procedure to Various Paradoxes.

5.2.1 Condorcet Winner, Lack of Monotonicity, Reinforcement, No-Show, Twin, Preference Inversion, and SCC Paradoxes -- 5.2.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 5.2.3 Absolute Majority Loser, Condorcet Loser, and Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradoxes -- 5.2.4 Truncation Paradox -- 5.2.4.1 Example -- 5.2.5 Remark -- 5.2.5.1 Example -- 5.3 The (In)Vulnerability of Coombs' Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.3.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 5.3.1.1 Example -- 5.3.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 5.3.3 Absolute Majority Loser, Condorcet Loser, and Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradoxes -- 5.3.4 Remark -- 5.3.4.1 Example -- 5.3.5 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.3.6 No-Show, Truncation, and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 5.3.6.1 Example -- 5.3.7 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.3.7.1 Example -- 5.3.8 Twin Paradox -- 5.3.8.1 Example -- 5.3.9 SCC Paradox -- 5.3.9.1 Example -- 5.4 The (In)Vulnerability of Bucklin's Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.4.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 5.4.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 5.4.3 Condorcet Loser Paradox -- 5.4.3.1 Example -- 5.4.4 Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 5.4.5 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.4.6 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.4.7 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.4.7.1 Example -- 5.4.8 No-Show, Twin, Truncation, and SCC Paradoxes -- 5.4.8.1 Example -- 5.4.9 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.4.9.1 Example -- 5.5 The (In)Vulnerability of the Range Voting (RV) Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.5.1 Condorcet Winner, Absolute Majority Winner, Condorcet Loser, and Absolute Majority Loser Paradoxes -- 5.5.1.1 Example -- 5.5.2 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.5.3 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.5.4 Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.5.5 No-Show Paradox -- 5.5.6 Twin Paradox -- 5.5.7 Truncation Paradox -- 5.5.7.1 Example -- 5.5.8 The SCC Paradox -- 5.5.9 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.5.9.1 Example.

5.6 The (In)Vulnerability of the Majority Judgment (MJ) Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 5.6.1 Condorcet Winner, Absolute Majority Winner, Condorcet Loser, and Absolute Majority Loser Paradoxes -- 5.6.1.1 Example -- 5.6.2 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 5.6.3 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 5.6.4 The Reinforcement Paradox -- 5.6.4.1 Example -- 5.6.5 The No-Show and Twin Paradoxes -- 5.6.5.1 Example -- 5.6.6 Truncation Paradox -- 5.6.6.1 Example -- 5.6.7 The SCC Paradox -- 5.6.8 The Preference Inversion Paradox -- 5.6.8.1 Example -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 6 The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 6.1 The (In)Vulnerability of the Minimax Procedure (aka Simpson-Kramer or Condorcet's Procedure) to Various Paradoxes -- 6.1.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 6.1.2 Condorcet Loser, Absolute Majority Loser and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 6.1.2.1 Example -- 6.1.3 The SCC Paradox -- 6.1.3.1 Example -- 6.1.4 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 6.1.5 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 6.1.6 Lack of Monotonicity Paradox -- 6.1.7 Reinforcement Paradox -- 6.1.7.1 Example -- 6.1.8 No-Show and Twin Paradoxes -- 6.1.8.1 Example -- 6.1.9 Truncation Paradox -- 6.1.9.1 Example -- 6.2 The (In)Vulnerability of Dodgson's Procedure to Various Paradoxes -- 6.2.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox -- 6.2.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 6.2.3 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox -- 6.2.4 The Condorcet Loser and Preference Inversion Paradoxes -- 6.2.4.1 Example -- 6.2.5 The Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 6.2.5.1 Example -- 6.2.6 Lack of Monotonicity, No-Show, Twin and SCC Paradoxes -- 6.2.6.1 Example -- 6.2.7 Reinforcement -- 6.2.7.1 Example -- 6.2.8 Truncation Paradox -- 6.2.8.1 Example -- 6.3 The (In)Vulnerability of Nanson's Procedure to Various Paradoxes.

6.3.1 Condorcet Winner Paradox.

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