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Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish.

By: Redish, Martin H [author.].
Material type: TextTextSeries: JSTOR eBooks.Publisher: Stanford, California : Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press, [2017]Description: 1 online resource (260 pages).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780804792905; 0804792909; 9781503601840; 1503601846.Subject(s): Judicial independence -- United States | Judicial power -- United States | Constitutional law -- United States | Democracy -- United StatesAdditional physical formats: Print version:: Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox.DDC classification: 347.73/12 LOC classification: KF5130 | .R43 2017Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism -- The foundations of American constitutionalism -- A taxonomy of judicial independence -- Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism -- State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism -- Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception -- Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism.
Summary: "The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. [This book] defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. [The author] explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence."--Back cover.
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Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
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KF5130 .R43 2017 (Browse shelf) https://ezproxy.uttyler.edu/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctvqsf012 Available ocn961035142

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism -- The foundations of American constitutionalism -- A taxonomy of judicial independence -- Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism -- State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism -- Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception -- Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism.

Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on January 19, 2018).

"The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. [This book] defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. [The author] explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence."--Back cover.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Even if one does not think the Cold War contained still valuable lessons for Sino-American relations, one would be compelled to study this book on the underemphasized story of Sino-US rivalries in the "Third World" during the Cold War. While Brazinsky primarily focuses on the 20th-century rivalry in Asia and Africa, he brings in an expansive geopolitical analysis of the motivations behind China's economic, cultural, and ideological strategies in regional rivalries with the US over global status, influence, and power. Brazinsky reviews, through American and Chinese archives and scholarly and journalistic commentary, the 60-year history of Sino-US confrontation and occasional cooperation (1919-79) up to the point of Nixon's China détente project, "completed" in the 1979 US recognition of the People's Republic of China. His deeply researched, narrowly focused, easy-flowing, and well-articulated book will be a tremendous asset to college undergraduates studying the Cold War and the current "Thucydides Trap," which encumbers the US as it seeks to deal effectively and peacefully with China's rise to power. Students should also review Henry Kissinger and Graham Allison, among others cited in the 61 pages of footnotes and citations, who comment on Sino-US diplomacy and the "Thucydides Trap" in the present day. Summing Up: Highly recommended. General readers; upper-division undergraduates through faculty. --Louisa Sue Hulett, Knox College

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Martin H. Redish is the Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. He is the author of The Adversary First Amendment (2013), Wholesale Justice (2009) and The Logic if Persecution (2005), all with Stanford University Press.

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