Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish.Material type: TextSeries: JSTOR eBooks.Publisher: Stanford, California : Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press, Description: 1 online resource (260 pages).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780804792905; 0804792909; 9781503601840; 1503601846.Subject(s): Judicial independence -- United States | Judicial power -- United States | Constitutional law -- United States | Democracy -- United StatesAdditional physical formats: Print version:: Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox.DDC classification: 347.73/12 LOC classification: KF5130 | .R43 2017Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
|Item type||Current location||Call number||URL||Status||Date due||Barcode|
|Electronic Book||UT Tyler Online Online||KF5130 .R43 2017 (Browse shelf)||https://ezproxy.uttyler.edu/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctvqsf012||Available||ocn961035142|
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism -- The foundations of American constitutionalism -- A taxonomy of judicial independence -- Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism -- State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism -- Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception -- Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism.
Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on January 19, 2018).
"The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. [This book] defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. [The author] explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence."--Back cover.