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Withdrawal : Reassessing America's Final Years in Vietnam.

By: Daddis, Gregory A.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Publisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2017Copyright date: ©2017Description: 1 online resource (321 pages).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780190691097.Subject(s): Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United StatesGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Withdrawal : Reassessing America's Final Years in VietnamDDC classification: 959.7043373 LOC classification: DS558.2.D333 2017Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Cover -- Withdrawal -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Lists of Abbreviations Used in the Text -- List of Abbreviations Used in the Notes -- Introduction: The Limits of Strategy in a Stalemated War -- 1. Abe's "One War": Continuity in Change -- 2. Vietnamization: Policy of Withdrawal or Strategy for "Victory"? -- 3. Pacification without Peace: The Travails of Nation Building -- 4. Balancing a War: The Coordination of Force and Diplomacy -- 5. A Beleaguered Army at a Long War's End -- 6. From Victory to Defeat?: Abrams's Final Years -- Epilogue and Conclusions: Questioning "Victory" in an American War -- Notes -- Index.
Summary: In a riveting sequel to his celebrated Westmoreland's War, Daddis offers a bold new interpretation of America's first lost war. Upending myths of a "better war" that led to victory in Vietnam, Withdrawal is required reading for anyone hoping to understand the final years of American intervention in Southeast Asia.
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DS558.2.D333 2017 (Browse shelf) https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uttyler/detail.action?docID=4985286 Available EBC4985286

Cover -- Withdrawal -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Lists of Abbreviations Used in the Text -- List of Abbreviations Used in the Notes -- Introduction: The Limits of Strategy in a Stalemated War -- 1. Abe's "One War": Continuity in Change -- 2. Vietnamization: Policy of Withdrawal or Strategy for "Victory"? -- 3. Pacification without Peace: The Travails of Nation Building -- 4. Balancing a War: The Coordination of Force and Diplomacy -- 5. A Beleaguered Army at a Long War's End -- 6. From Victory to Defeat?: Abrams's Final Years -- Epilogue and Conclusions: Questioning "Victory" in an American War -- Notes -- Index.

In a riveting sequel to his celebrated Westmoreland's War, Daddis offers a bold new interpretation of America's first lost war. Upending myths of a "better war" that led to victory in Vietnam, Withdrawal is required reading for anyone hoping to understand the final years of American intervention in Southeast Asia.

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Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Daddis (history, Chapman Univ.) has completed his tripartite examination of US strategy in the Vietnam War, e.g., Westmoreland's War (CH, Jul'14, 51-6359), with this new book. The author methodically takes apart the myths surrounding the latter years of the war, including that General William Westmoreland's replacement as commander of MACV, General Creighton Abrams, developed a more successful strategy that, were it not for the failure of US political will at home, would have won the war by late 1970. Daddis convincingly shows that far from developing a new strategy, Abrams instead continued Westmoreland's multifaceted approach of pacification, political development of the South Vietnamese government, building up South Vietnamese military forces, and security stabilization through aggressive military operations designed to attrit Vietcong and NVA forces. Abrams changed very little, and the stalemate continued. Ultimately, political decisions by the Nixon administration predetermined the outcome of the war. As Daddis has previously argued, US military strategy in Vietnam was too complex for politicians in Washington to fully understand. Moreover, US policy in Vietnam was bad to begin with; even good strategy cannot overcome bad policy. Summing Up: Highly recommended. All public and academic levels/libraries. --William Thomas Allison, Georgia Southern University

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Gregory Daddis is Associate Professor of history and director of Chapman University's MA Program in War and Society. A retired US Army colonel, he has served in both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Daddis specializes in the history of the Vietnam Wars and the Cold War era.

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