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Reflections on the Cuban missile crisis / Raymond L. Garthoff.

By: Garthoff, Raymond L.
Material type: TextTextPublisher: Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, c1989Edition: Rev. ed.Description: viii, 236 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 0815730535 (alk. paper); 9780815730538 (alk. paper).Subject(s): Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 | Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962DDC classification: 972.9106/4 LOC classification: E841 | .G37 1989Other classification: 15.50
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Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode
Book University of Texas At Tyler
Stacks - 3rd Floor
E841 .G37 1989 (Browse shelf) Available 0000000465898
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E841 .E75 2000 The missile crisis in Cuba / E841 .F34 The Kennedy promise; E841 .F86 1997 One hell of a gamble : E841 .G37 1989 Reflections on the Cuban missile crisis / E841 .G54 1991 The presidency of John F. Kennedy / E841 .G54 2006 The presidency of John F. Kennedy / E841 .G57 1993 The sixties :

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

In this compelling monograph-cum-memoir, Garthoff brilliantly answers those who have questioned whether we have overstudied the Cuban Missile Crisis. A Soviet specialist who served in the State Department in 1962, Garthoff draws on his recollections, recently declassified memoranda, Soviet sources, and the wealth of Western publications to provide a lucid and balanced account of the crisis and its implications. In contrast to Allison's now standard treatment in Essence of Decision (CH, Apr '72), Garthoff offers no models of US decision making; he adopts implicitly the ``rational-actor'' model. The strength of the book lies in its careful and persuasive analysis of Soviet motives in placing the missiles and of their behavior in the crisis itself. Deftly synthesizing a variety of materials, Garthoff argues that their prime wish was to overcome US strategic superiority. The book is also useful in offering some general remarks on the ``long-term legacy'' of the crisis from both Soviet and US standpoints. He concludes, encouragingly, that the Soviets ``drew the lesson that crisis avoidance was better than crisis management.'' Concise and readable, Garthoff's book will join Allison and Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days (1969) as essential reading on this momentous event. A useful index and extensive bibliographic footnotes. Undergraduates, graduates, faculty, and general readers.-M.J. Smith, University of Virginia

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