Vietnam : the history of an unwinnable war, 1945-1975 / John Prados.
By: Prados, John.Material type: BookSeries: Modern war studies: Publisher: Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, c2009Description: xxvii, 665 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.ISBN: 9780700616343 (cloth : alk. paper); 0700616349 (cloth : alk. paper).Subject(s): Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -- United States | United States -- Politics and government -- 1945-1989 | United States -- History -- 1945-Additional physical formats: Online version:: Vietnam.DDC classification: 959.704/3 Other classification: 15.75 | 15.85
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|Book||University of Texas At Tyler Stacks - 3rd Floor||DS558 .P743 2009 (Browse shelf)||Available||0000001947829|
Includes bibliographical references (p. 551-612) and index.
April 1971 : veterans at war -- A splendid little war -- March-July 1954: Dien Bien Phu, Geneva, and the harnessing of American power -- Many roads to quagmire (1954-1960) -- Loose the fateful lightning (1961-1964) -- August 1964: the last mystery of the Tonkin Gulf -- Burnished rows of steel (1964-1965) -- A hundred circling camps (1965-1967) -- Trampling out the vintage (1967) -- January-May 1968 : Tet Mau Than -- Terrible swift sword (1968-1969) -- Crush the serpent under heel (1969) -- Dim and flaring lamps (1969-1971) -- Die to make men free (1970) -- Sound forth the trumpet (1971) -- Evening dews and damps (1971-1972) -- Sifting out the hearts of men (1972) -- The truth comes marching home.
The Vietnam war continues to be the focus of intense controversy. While most people, liberals, conservatives, Democrats, Republicans, historians, pundits, and citizens alike, agree that the United States did not win the war, a vocal minority argue the opposite or debate why victory never came, attributing the quagmire to everything from domestic politics to the press. The military never lost a battle; how then did it not win the war? Stepping back from this overheated fray and drawing upon several decades of research the author takes a fresh look at both the war and the debates about it to produce a reassessment of one of our nation's most tragic episodes. He weaves together multiple perspectives across an epic-sized canvas where domestic politics, ideologies, nations, and militaries all collide. He patiently pieces back together the events and moments, from the end of World War II until our dispiriting departure from Vietnam in 1975, that reveal a war that now appears to have been truly unwinnable due to opportunities lost, missed, ignored, or refused. He shows how, from the Truman through the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, American leaders consistently ignored or misunderstood the realities in Southeast Asia and passed up every opportunity to avoid war in the first place or avoid becoming ever more mired in it after it began. Highlighting especially Eisenhower's seminal and long-lasting influence on our Vietnam policy, he demonstrates how and why our range of choices narrowed with each passing year, while our decision making continued to be distorted by Cold War politics and fundamental misperceptions about the culture, psychology, goals, and abilities of both our enemies and our allies in Vietnam.