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Approval voting / Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn.

By: Brams, Steven J.
Contributor(s): Fishburn, Peter C.
Material type: TextTextSeries: Springer.Publisher: New York : Springer, c2007Edition: 2nd ed.Description: 1 online resource (xxi, 198 p.) : ill.ISBN: 0387498958 (pbk. : alk. paper); 9780387498959 (pbk. : alk. paper); 0387498966 (e-ISBN); 9780387498966 (e-ISBN); 9786610940523; 6610940525.Subject(s): Voting, Plural | Voting, Plural -- United StatesAdditional physical formats: Print version:: Approval voting.LOC classification: JF1023 | .B73 2007Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution; Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?; The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?; The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules; Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?; Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data; Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections; Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions; Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election; Epilogue.
Review: "Approval Voting proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and-by offering voters the opportunity to influence election outcomes more equitably-a probable increase in voter turnout."--Jacket.
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JF1023 .B73 2007 (Browse shelf) http://ezproxy.uttyler.edu:2048/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-49896-6 Available ocn174143534
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JF1001.K43 2009 Voting for Policy, Not Parties : JF1001 .M38 2006 Mathematics and democracy : JF1001 .R55 2012 Voter Turnout : JF1023 .B73 2007 Approval voting / JF1023 .H36 2010 Handbook on approval voting / JF1032 .V6 2007 E-voting and identity : JF1051 The Eyes of the People :

Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-188) and index.

"Approval Voting proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and-by offering voters the opportunity to influence election outcomes more equitably-a probable increase in voter turnout."--Jacket.

Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution; Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?; The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?; The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules; Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?; Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data; Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections; Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions; Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election; Epilogue.

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Steven J. Brams is professor of politics at New York University. <p> (Bowker Author Biography)

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