Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Blameworthy belief : a study in epistemic deontologism / Nikolaj Nottelmann.

By: Nottelmann, Nikolaj.
Material type: TextTextSeries: Springer.Synthese library: v. 338.Publisher: Dordrecht ; London : Springer, 2007Description: 1 online resource (1 v.).ISBN: 9781402059612; 1402059612.Subject(s): Knowledge, Theory of | EthicsAdditional physical formats: Print version:: Blameworthy belief.Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Front Matter; Introduction; Belief and Acceptance; Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness; Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief; Epistemic Undesirability; Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness; Doxastic Control; Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism; Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism; Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism; Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism; Intellectual Obligations.
Summary: Believing the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms. This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blamew.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Item type Current location Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
Online
BD161 .N68 2007 (Browse shelf) http://ezproxy.uttyler.edu:2048/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2 Available ocn188110159

Believing the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms. This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blamew.

Front Matter; Introduction; Belief and Acceptance; Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness; Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief; Epistemic Undesirability; Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness; Doxastic Control; Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism; Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism; Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism; Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism; Intellectual Obligations.

Description based on print version record.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.