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Voting for Policy, Not Parties : How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing

By: Kedar, Orit.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics: Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009Description: 1 online resource (240 p.).ISBN: 9780511657078.Subject(s): Comparative government | Political parties | Political planning | Public opinion | Representative government and representation | VotingGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Voting for Policy, Not Parties : How Voters Compensate for Power SharingDDC classification: 324.65 | 324.9 LOC classification: JF1001.K43 2009Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Dedication; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Tables and Figures; Tables; Figures; Acknowledgments; Part I Voting For Policy; 1 Introduction: Institutional Sources of Voter Choice; 2 A Theory of Compensatory Vote; Part II Empirical Evidence: How Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power; 3 Compensatory Vote in Parliamentary Democracies; 4 Balancing Strong (and Weak) Presidents; 5 Compensatory Vote in Federations: Evidence from Germany; Part III Theoretical Implications; 6 Conclusion; References; Index
Summary: This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal.
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Item type Current location Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
Online
JF1001.K43 2009 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=472010 Available EBL472010

Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Dedication; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Tables and Figures; Tables; Figures; Acknowledgments; Part I Voting For Policy; 1 Introduction: Institutional Sources of Voter Choice; 2 A Theory of Compensatory Vote; Part II Empirical Evidence: How Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power; 3 Compensatory Vote in Parliamentary Democracies; 4 Balancing Strong (and Weak) Presidents; 5 Compensatory Vote in Federations: Evidence from Germany; Part III Theoretical Implications; 6 Conclusion; References; Index

This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal.

Description based upon print version of record.

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