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Vietnam's Second Front : Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War

By: Johns, Andrew L.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Publisher: Lexington : The University Press of Kentucky, 2010Description: 1 online resource (447 p.).ISBN: 9780813173696.Subject(s): Executive power -- United States -- History -- 20th century | Politics and war -- United States -- History -- 20th century | Republican Party (U.S. : 1854- ) -- History -- 20th century | Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -- United StatesGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Vietnam's Second Front : Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the WarDDC classification: 327.730597 | 959.704 LOC classification: DS558Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Front cover; Copyright page; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 Trapped between Scylla and Charybdis; 2 The Cassandra Conundrum; 3 Opening Pandora's Box; 4 Confronting the Hydra; 5 Sisyphus and Tantalus; 6 The Zalmoxis Effect; 7 The Icarus Agenda; 8 Whither Ariadne?; Conclusion; Appendix: Republicans, 1961-1973; Notes; Bibliography; Index; Back cover
Summary: The Vietnam War has been analyzed, dissected, and debated from multiple perspectives for decades, but domestic considerations -- such as partisan politics and election-year maneuvering -- are often overlooked as determining factors in the evolution and outcome of America's longest war.In Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War, Andrew L. Johns assesses the influence of the Republican Party -- its congressional leadership, politicians, grassroots organizations, and the Nixon administration -- on the escalation, prosecution, and resolution of the Vi
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Item type Current location Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
Online
DS558 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=792260 Available EBL792260

Front cover; Copyright page; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 Trapped between Scylla and Charybdis; 2 The Cassandra Conundrum; 3 Opening Pandora's Box; 4 Confronting the Hydra; 5 Sisyphus and Tantalus; 6 The Zalmoxis Effect; 7 The Icarus Agenda; 8 Whither Ariadne?; Conclusion; Appendix: Republicans, 1961-1973; Notes; Bibliography; Index; Back cover

The Vietnam War has been analyzed, dissected, and debated from multiple perspectives for decades, but domestic considerations -- such as partisan politics and election-year maneuvering -- are often overlooked as determining factors in the evolution and outcome of America's longest war.In Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War, Andrew L. Johns assesses the influence of the Republican Party -- its congressional leadership, politicians, grassroots organizations, and the Nixon administration -- on the escalation, prosecution, and resolution of the Vi

Description based upon print version of record.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Johns (Brigham Young Univ.) contributes greatly to understanding the Vietnam conflict. His wonderfully written examination explores how domestic political considerations, especially those posed by hawkish Republican conservatives, made it highly unlikely, if not impossible, for Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon to disengage in Vietnam by deescalating or negotiating an end to the war with North Vietnam. In effect, even Nixon's "peace with honor" ploy, stepped-up bombing, and Vietnamization attempted to negate any appearance of abandoning Southeast Asia to communism. Johns focuses on hawks--Eisenhower, Goldwater, and Nixon, for example--but some of the best passages discuss the dovish positions and influence of Republicans like Mark Hatfield and presidential candidate George Romney. The author is insightful about hawkish congressional Republicans supporting Johnson more than congressional Democrats, as long as Americanization of the war was not too gradual. Republicans complained that Johnson's approach was too limited to defeat North Vietnam; yet even Eisenhower rejected a declaration of war for fear of direct intervention by the Chinese and Soviets. One reservation: Johns' analysis tends to deemphasize geopolitical considerations in an effort to make his case. Summing Up: Recommended. Most levels/libraries. T. Zoumaras Truman State University

Author notes provided by Syndetics

<p> Andrew L. Johns , associate professor of history at Brigham Young University, is coeditor of The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War .</p>

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