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Success and Failure in Limited War : Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

By: Bakich, Spencer D.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Publisher: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2014Description: 1 online resource (344 p.).ISBN: 9780226107851.Subject(s): Iraq War, 2003-2011 | Korean War, 1950-1953 | Persian Gulf War, 1991 | United States -- History, Military -- 20th century | United States -- History, Military -- 21st century | Vietnam War, 1961-1975Genre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Success and Failure in Limited War : Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq WarsDDC classification: 355.00973 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Contents; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One: Information Institutions and Strategy in War; Chapter Two: Explaining Strategic Performance in Limited Warfare; Chapter Three: Military and Diplomatic Defeat in the Korean War; Chapter Four: The Vietnam War, Little Consolation; Chapter Five: Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War; Chapter Six: Iraq - Win the Battle, Lose the War; Chapter Seven: Information Institutions Matter!; Notes; Bibliography; Index
Summary: Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation-be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions.Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account
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Item type Current location Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
Online
E745 .B35 2014 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1639068 Available EBL1639068

Contents; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One: Information Institutions and Strategy in War; Chapter Two: Explaining Strategic Performance in Limited Warfare; Chapter Three: Military and Diplomatic Defeat in the Korean War; Chapter Four: The Vietnam War, Little Consolation; Chapter Five: Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War; Chapter Six: Iraq - Win the Battle, Lose the War; Chapter Seven: Information Institutions Matter!; Notes; Bibliography; Index

Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation-be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions.Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account

Description based upon print version of record.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Bakich's treatment of the issue of information in determining warfare strategy includes topics such as the availability and quality of information and how it is acquired, analyzed, and employed. In two theoretical chapters on the development and role of strategy in a limited war, Bakich (Sweet Briar College) posits a construct called "information institutions," which determine the flow of information. He flushes out the functioning or failures of these patterns in four case studies--Korea, Vietnam, and the first and second Iraq wars. He determines that in all four cases, sufficient information existed to enable the US to design and execute an effective limited war strategy. However, how this information was handled and managed resulted in cardinal failures in strategy in all four cases. Although the author makes some contribution to international relations theory, the book is tedious. The case studies are not engaging, and the divined theory speaks to only a small audience of aficionados. For most readers, memoirs such as Robert Gates's recent Duty (CH, Oct'14, 52-1108) provide better glimpses into how information is used, mishandled, and misappropriated by actors in the decision process. In sum, the book has limited appeal. --Joe P. Dunn, Converse College

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