An evolutionary model of industry transformation and the political sustainability of emission control policies / Steven C. Isley [and three others].

By: Isley, Steven C [author.]Contributor(s): Lempert, Robert J [author.] | Popper, Steven W, 1953- [author.] | Vardavas, Raffaele [author.] | Rand Justice, Infrastructure, and Environment (Organization). Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program | Rand Corporation | National Science Foundation (U.S.)Material type: TextTextSeries: JSTOR eBooksPublisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2013Description: 1 online resource (104 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780833083081 (electronic bk.); 0833083082 (electronic bk.)Subject(s): Carbon dioxide mitigation | Climatic changes | Decision making -- Mathematical models | Emissions trading | Environmental policy | Evolutionary economicsLOC classification: TD885.5.C3Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Introduction -- Design of Robust Decision Making Analysis -- Model Design -- Calibration -- Representative Analysis -- Next Steps -- Appendix A: Computation of the Social Cost of Carbon -- Appendix B: The Lobbying Game -- Appendix C: Adaptive Learning Model for R&D Decisions -- Appendix D: Starting Cases -- Appendix E: Representative Analysis Details -- Appendix F: Parameter List.
Summary: Limiting the extent and effects of climate change requires the transformation of industrial, commercial, energy, and transportation systems. To achieve its goals, a near-term policy has to sustain itself for many decades. Market-based policies should prove useful in promoting such transformations. But which policies might do so most effectively? How can such policies be designed so that they endure politically over the long-term? While standard economic theory provides an excellent understanding of the efficiency-enhancing potential of markets, it sheds less insight on their transformational implications. In particular, the introduction of markets often also leads to significant changes in society⁰́₉s values, technology, and institutions, and these types of market-induced transformations are generally not well understood. This report presents a simulation framework with both game theoretic and agent-based components designed to model evolutionary changes in the firms belonging to an industry sector and how these may form changing coalitions that influence how government sets a price for carbon emissions. The model captures the complex interactions between market-formation, technological innovation, government regulatory policy and the emergent climate change. It tests a set of outcome measures under different carbon emission control policies. The model is a tool to support the design of a government⁰́₉s regulatory policy by using robust decision making to examine how measures intended to reduce emissions of climate-changing greenhouse gasses may give rise to market-induced transformations that in turn may ease or hinder the government⁰́₉s ability to maintain its policy.
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TD885.5.C3 (Browse shelf) https://ezproxy.uttyler.edu/login?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhv4p Available ocn867484000

Title from title screen (viewed on September 3, 2013).

Includes bibliographical references.

Introduction -- Design of Robust Decision Making Analysis -- Model Design -- Calibration -- Representative Analysis -- Next Steps -- Appendix A: Computation of the Social Cost of Carbon -- Appendix B: The Lobbying Game -- Appendix C: Adaptive Learning Model for R&D Decisions -- Appendix D: Starting Cases -- Appendix E: Representative Analysis Details -- Appendix F: Parameter List.

Limiting the extent and effects of climate change requires the transformation of industrial, commercial, energy, and transportation systems. To achieve its goals, a near-term policy has to sustain itself for many decades. Market-based policies should prove useful in promoting such transformations. But which policies might do so most effectively? How can such policies be designed so that they endure politically over the long-term? While standard economic theory provides an excellent understanding of the efficiency-enhancing potential of markets, it sheds less insight on their transformational implications. In particular, the introduction of markets often also leads to significant changes in society⁰́₉s values, technology, and institutions, and these types of market-induced transformations are generally not well understood. This report presents a simulation framework with both game theoretic and agent-based components designed to model evolutionary changes in the firms belonging to an industry sector and how these may form changing coalitions that influence how government sets a price for carbon emissions. The model captures the complex interactions between market-formation, technological innovation, government regulatory policy and the emergent climate change. It tests a set of outcome measures under different carbon emission control policies. The model is a tool to support the design of a government⁰́₉s regulatory policy by using robust decision making to examine how measures intended to reduce emissions of climate-changing greenhouse gasses may give rise to market-induced transformations that in turn may ease or hinder the government⁰́₉s ability to maintain its policy.

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