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From People’s War to People’s Rule : Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam

By: Lomperis, Timothy J.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Publisher: Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 1996Edition: 1.Description: 1 online resource (898 p.).ISBN: 9780807863046.Subject(s): Insurgency -- Southeast Asia | Southeast Asia -- Politics and government -- 1945- | United States -- Foreign relations -- 1963-1969 | Vietnam -- History -- 1945-1975 | Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -- United StatesGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: From People’s War to People’s Rule : Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of VietnamDDC classification: 327.73 | 959.704/3373 | 959.7043373 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Cover Page; FROM PEOPLE'S WAR TO PEOPLE'S RULE; Copyright Page; Dedication; CONTENTS; TABLES AND FIGURES; PREFACE; PART I Theory and Context; INTRODUCTION FROM GHOST TO LESSON; CHAPTER 1 ON THE BUSINESS OF LESSONS; CHAPTER 2 LEGITIMACY, INSURGENCY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE VIETNAM WAR; CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF LEGITIMACY, INSURGENCY, AND INTERVENTION; PART II Vietnam, the Deviant Case; CHAPTER 4 HISTORICAL SETTING: THE EARTHLY STRUGGLE FOR HEAVEN'S MANDATE; CHAPTER 5 FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS: THE WAR WITHOUT A LESSON?; PART III The Comparative Prism
CHAPTER 6 CHINA, 1920-1949: THE LONG MARCH TO LIBERATIONCHAPTER 7 GREECE 1941-1949: THREE ROUNDS TO ALBANIA; CHAPTER 8 THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1956: LIBERATION DEFLECTED; CHAPTER 9 MALAYA, 1948-1960: THE UNMAKING OF AN INSURGENCY; CHAPTER 10 CAMBODIA'S "AUTOGENOCIDE" AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF LAOS, 1949-1975; PART IV Lessons; CHAPTER 11 FINDINGS FROM THE PRISM AND AN APPLICATION: SENDERO LUMINOSO OF PERU; CONCLUSION THE NEW ERA: WILSON'S TRIUMPH OVER LENIN; APPENDIX 1 THE LITERATURES OF THE FRAMEWORK; APPENDIX 2 A TALE OF TWO STRATEGIES: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
APPENDIX 3 ASSUMPTIONS, THEMATIC QUESTIONS, AND PROPOSITIONSNOTES; INDEX
Summary: From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam
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Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
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DS558 .L64 1996 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=880271 Available EBL880271
Browsing UT Tyler Online Shelves , Shelving location: Online Close shelf browser
DS558 c1986 Intervention : DS558 .G384 2014 Mythologizing the Vietnam War : DS558 .H47 2015 Vietnam : DS558 .L64 1996 From People’s War to People’s Rule : DS558 .M354 2016 The American war in Vietnam : DS558 .O45 2014 Where the Domino Fell : DS558 .O476 2013 Where the Domino Fell :

Cover Page; FROM PEOPLE'S WAR TO PEOPLE'S RULE; Copyright Page; Dedication; CONTENTS; TABLES AND FIGURES; PREFACE; PART I Theory and Context; INTRODUCTION FROM GHOST TO LESSON; CHAPTER 1 ON THE BUSINESS OF LESSONS; CHAPTER 2 LEGITIMACY, INSURGENCY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE VIETNAM WAR; CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF LEGITIMACY, INSURGENCY, AND INTERVENTION; PART II Vietnam, the Deviant Case; CHAPTER 4 HISTORICAL SETTING: THE EARTHLY STRUGGLE FOR HEAVEN'S MANDATE; CHAPTER 5 FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS: THE WAR WITHOUT A LESSON?; PART III The Comparative Prism

CHAPTER 6 CHINA, 1920-1949: THE LONG MARCH TO LIBERATIONCHAPTER 7 GREECE 1941-1949: THREE ROUNDS TO ALBANIA; CHAPTER 8 THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1956: LIBERATION DEFLECTED; CHAPTER 9 MALAYA, 1948-1960: THE UNMAKING OF AN INSURGENCY; CHAPTER 10 CAMBODIA'S "AUTOGENOCIDE" AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF LAOS, 1949-1975; PART IV Lessons; CHAPTER 11 FINDINGS FROM THE PRISM AND AN APPLICATION: SENDERO LUMINOSO OF PERU; CONCLUSION THE NEW ERA: WILSON'S TRIUMPH OVER LENIN; APPENDIX 1 THE LITERATURES OF THE FRAMEWORK; APPENDIX 2 A TALE OF TWO STRATEGIES: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

APPENDIX 3 ASSUMPTIONS, THEMATIC QUESTIONS, AND PROPOSITIONSNOTES; INDEX

From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam

Description based upon print version of record.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

Library Journal Review

In his third work on the Vietnam War (after The War Everyone Lost‘And Won, LJ 1/84, and Reading the Wind, Duke Univ., 1986), Lomperis, a former army intelligence officer in Vietnam and currently an instructor in political science at West Point, places the war within the broader context of Communist insurgency against Western-supported regimes throughout the Cold War. Lomperis examines and compares the Chinese liberation struggle; civil wars in Greece, Cambodia, and Laos; rebellion in the Philippines; and the carnage in Peru so that the sophisticated reader can see the similarities and differences among these conflicts and the pivotal roles played by insurgents, local governments, and foreign powers. Each insurrection is well documented with conclusions buttressed by Lomperis's obvious expertise in his field. Marred only by a tendency to lapse into technical jargon, his work belongs in academic libraries, but only public libraries with strong Vietnam collections should consider adding a scholarly work such as this.‘John R. Vallely, Siena Coll. Lib., Loudonville, N.Y. (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

CHOICE Review

Lomperis (political science, St. Louis Univ.) has written a dense, copiously detailed comparative analysis of the American War in Vietnam in relation to seven other "Marxist People's Wars" of the post-WW II era. He contends that the so-called "lessons" of the American experience in Vietnam are meaningless unless that experience is compared with insurgencies/interventions involving the French in Vietnam, Greece, Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Cambodia, and Laos. Examining these insurgencies, Lomperis argues that the American war was an aberration, in that the Marxist People's insurgency was actually defeated militarily during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Ironically, US leaders were unable to press their advantage because of political opposition at home. Ultimately, the North Vietnamese won the war through conventional military means rather than insurgency. Lomperis concludes that such insurgencies fail when confronted with meaningful land reform and with relatively free elections in which insurgents can participate. An interesting analysis, although the theoretical parts are tough going even for specialists. Upper-division undergraduates and above. A. O. Edmonds Ball State University

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