Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations

By: Yarhi-Milo, KerenMaterial type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on DemandPrinceton Studies in International History and Politics: Publisher: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2014Description: 1 online resource (369 p.)ISBN: 9781400850419Subject(s): Great Britain -- Foreign relations -- 1936-1945 | Intelligence service | International relations | World politics -- 20th centuryGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International RelationsDDC classification: 327.12 LOC classification: JF1525.I6 .K384 2014Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; CONTENTS; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Chapter 1 Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention; Chapter 2 Indicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39; Chapter 3 British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions; Chapter 4 The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions; Chapter 5 The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977-80; Chapter 6 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente
Chapter 7 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of DétenteChapter 8 Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88; Chapter 9 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War; Chapter 10 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War; Chapter 11 Summary and Implications; Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses; Notes; Index
Summary: States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Item type Current location Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
Online
JF1525.I6 .K384 2014 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1637701 Available EBL1637701

Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; CONTENTS; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Chapter 1 Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention; Chapter 2 Indicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39; Chapter 3 British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions; Chapter 4 The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions; Chapter 5 The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977-80; Chapter 6 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente

Chapter 7 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of DétenteChapter 8 Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88; Chapter 9 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War; Chapter 10 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War; Chapter 11 Summary and Implications; Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses; Notes; Index

States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's

Description based upon print version of record.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

This solid scholarly book is a bit dry even though its preferred thesis emphasizes that top policy makers are often decisively influenced by vivid impressions about their counterparts from other countries. The major contribution of the book is the systematic focus on a notoriously amorphous subject-how world leaders and intelligence organizations draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Three mainstream theories are contrasted with a new theoretical framework, selective attention, to compare respective findings about three cases: British assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, US assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and Reagan administration assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. In each case, the selective attention thesis is identified as the most plausible explanation. An introductory chapter on the competing theories is followed by three chapters on each case study. Chapter 11 offers a summary and implications followed by notes and an index. The conclusion that decision makers and intelligence analysts looked at different indicators and that the attention paid by both groups was highly selective is worrisome. Recommended for professionals, this book is not easily accessible to undergraduates. Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate, research, and professional collections. --Michael A. Morris, emeritus, Clemson University

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Keren Yarhi-Milo is assistant professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.