Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International RelationsMaterial type: TextSeries: eBooks on DemandPrinceton Studies in International History and Politics: Publisher: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2014Description: 1 online resource (369 p.)ISBN: 9781400850419Subject(s): Great Britain -- Foreign relations -- 1936-1945 | Intelligence service | International relations | World politics -- 20th centuryGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International RelationsDDC classification: 327.12 LOC classification: JF1525.I6 .K384 2014Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
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|Electronic Book||UT Tyler Online Online||JF1525.I6 .K384 2014 (Browse shelf)||http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1637701||Available||EBL1637701|
Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; CONTENTS; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Chapter 1 Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention; Chapter 2 Indicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39; Chapter 3 British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions; Chapter 4 The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions; Chapter 5 The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977-80; Chapter 6 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente
Chapter 7 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of DétenteChapter 8 Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88; Chapter 9 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War; Chapter 10 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War; Chapter 11 Summary and Implications; Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses; Notes; Index
States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's
Description based upon print version of record.