Preventing Corporate Corruption : The Anti-Bribery Compliance Model

By: Manacorda, StefanoContributor(s): Centonze, Francesco | Forti, GabrioMaterial type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on DemandPublisher: Dordrecht : Springer, 2014Description: 1 online resource (526 p.)ISBN: 9783319044804Genre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Preventing Corporate Corruption : The Anti-Bribery Compliance ModelDDC classification: 364.1323 LOC classification: HV6768 | .M363 2014Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Preface ; Contents; Contributors; Part I ; Moving Towards the ABC Model: A General Overview; Towards an Anti-Bribery Compliance Model: Methods and Strategies for a "Hybrid Normativity"; Chapter-1; 1.1 Introduction: Meaning and Purposes of an Anti-Bribery Compliance Model; 1.2 A New Step in International Criminal-Policy Responses Against Corruption?; 1.3 The Current Picture: An "Integrated Criminal Policy" Against Corruption; 1.3.1 Hard-Law Versus Soft-Law Sources; 1.3.1.1 Review Mechanisms; 1.3.1.2 Guidelines; 1.3.2 Public Versus Private Initiatives; 1.3.3 Preventive Versus Punitive Measures
1.3.3.1 Civil Remedies1.3.3.2 Administrative and Criminal Measures; 1.4 One Step Further: The ABC Model as "Normative Hybridization"; 1.4.1 Combining Hetero-Regulation and Self-Regulation; 1.4.2 Integrating Hard Law and Soft Law; 1.4.3 Merging Preventive and Punitive Measures; 1.5 Drafting the ABC Model: Coordinated Self-Regulation; 1.6 Implementing the ABC Model: "A Double Track" for States and Corporations; 1.7 Enforcing the ABC Model: Incentives and Criminal Law Responses; 1.8 Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter-2
The Universal Approach of the United Nations Convention Against CorruptionChapter-3; The Private Sector Role in the Fight Against Corruption; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Internal Anti-bribery Compliance Programs: General; 3.3 The Requirements for Anti-bribery Compliance Models: Red Flags and the Internal Anti-bribery Unit; 3.4 The Growing Importance of Best Practice and International Comparison; 3.5 Collective Action; 3.6 Cooperation with the Authorities; References; Chapter-4; Public-Private Partnerships and Agency Problems: The Use of Incentives in Strategies to Combat Corruption
4.1 Public-Private Partnerships and the Delegation of Corruption Prevention Tasks to Entities4.2 Instrumental Motivations and Relational Incentives; 4.3 The Efficacy of Compliance Programs in Crime Prevention and the Reasons Why Organizations Choose Cooperation; 4.4 "Carrots versus Sticks" in the Public-Private Partnership: Source, Form, and Purpose of the Incentives; 4.5 The Institutional Perspective: Incentives to the Entity; 4.5.1 Compliance Incentives and the Entity's Residual Liability Risk; 4.5.2 Self-Reporting Incentives: The Individual and the Organization
4.5.3 Disincentives to Compliance and Reporting: The Problem of International Double Jeopardy4.6 The Entity's Perspective: Incentives to Individuals in the Organization.; References; Chapter-5; Internal Investigations, Whistle-Blowing, and Cooperation: The Struggle for Information in the Criminal Process; 5.1 The Criminal Process as a Struggle for Information; 5.2 Whistle-Blowing Channels and Internal Amnesty Programs; 5.3 The Ombudsman and Self-Auditing Privileges; 5.4 Internal Investigations and the Criminal Process; 5.5 Internal Investigation and the Corporation's Right of Defense
5.6 Internal Investigations and the Employees' Right to Defense
Summary: This book presents the results of a two-year international research project conducted for the?United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) to investigate and provide solutions for reducing?bribery and corruption in corporations and institutions.?It starts with an empirical?case study on the effectiveness?of a set of self-regulation rules?adopted by multinational companies?in the energy sector. Second, it explores?the context and factors leading to corruption internationally (and?the relationships between domestic criminal law and self-regulation).?Third, it examines?guidelines for the adop
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Preface ; Contents; Contributors; Part I ; Moving Towards the ABC Model: A General Overview; Towards an Anti-Bribery Compliance Model: Methods and Strategies for a "Hybrid Normativity"; Chapter-1; 1.1 Introduction: Meaning and Purposes of an Anti-Bribery Compliance Model; 1.2 A New Step in International Criminal-Policy Responses Against Corruption?; 1.3 The Current Picture: An "Integrated Criminal Policy" Against Corruption; 1.3.1 Hard-Law Versus Soft-Law Sources; 1.3.1.1 Review Mechanisms; 1.3.1.2 Guidelines; 1.3.2 Public Versus Private Initiatives; 1.3.3 Preventive Versus Punitive Measures

1.3.3.1 Civil Remedies1.3.3.2 Administrative and Criminal Measures; 1.4 One Step Further: The ABC Model as "Normative Hybridization"; 1.4.1 Combining Hetero-Regulation and Self-Regulation; 1.4.2 Integrating Hard Law and Soft Law; 1.4.3 Merging Preventive and Punitive Measures; 1.5 Drafting the ABC Model: Coordinated Self-Regulation; 1.6 Implementing the ABC Model: "A Double Track" for States and Corporations; 1.7 Enforcing the ABC Model: Incentives and Criminal Law Responses; 1.8 Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter-2

The Universal Approach of the United Nations Convention Against CorruptionChapter-3; The Private Sector Role in the Fight Against Corruption; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Internal Anti-bribery Compliance Programs: General; 3.3 The Requirements for Anti-bribery Compliance Models: Red Flags and the Internal Anti-bribery Unit; 3.4 The Growing Importance of Best Practice and International Comparison; 3.5 Collective Action; 3.6 Cooperation with the Authorities; References; Chapter-4; Public-Private Partnerships and Agency Problems: The Use of Incentives in Strategies to Combat Corruption

4.1 Public-Private Partnerships and the Delegation of Corruption Prevention Tasks to Entities4.2 Instrumental Motivations and Relational Incentives; 4.3 The Efficacy of Compliance Programs in Crime Prevention and the Reasons Why Organizations Choose Cooperation; 4.4 "Carrots versus Sticks" in the Public-Private Partnership: Source, Form, and Purpose of the Incentives; 4.5 The Institutional Perspective: Incentives to the Entity; 4.5.1 Compliance Incentives and the Entity's Residual Liability Risk; 4.5.2 Self-Reporting Incentives: The Individual and the Organization

4.5.3 Disincentives to Compliance and Reporting: The Problem of International Double Jeopardy4.6 The Entity's Perspective: Incentives to Individuals in the Organization.; References; Chapter-5; Internal Investigations, Whistle-Blowing, and Cooperation: The Struggle for Information in the Criminal Process; 5.1 The Criminal Process as a Struggle for Information; 5.2 Whistle-Blowing Channels and Internal Amnesty Programs; 5.3 The Ombudsman and Self-Auditing Privileges; 5.4 Internal Investigations and the Criminal Process; 5.5 Internal Investigation and the Corporation's Right of Defense

5.6 Internal Investigations and the Employees' Right to Defense

This book presents the results of a two-year international research project conducted for the?United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) to investigate and provide solutions for reducing?bribery and corruption in corporations and institutions.?It starts with an empirical?case study on the effectiveness?of a set of self-regulation rules?adopted by multinational companies?in the energy sector. Second, it explores?the context and factors leading to corruption internationally (and?the relationships between domestic criminal law and self-regulation).?Third, it examines?guidelines for the adop

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Author notes provided by Syndetics

Stefano Manacorda (BA University of Naples; LLM Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne; PhD University of Florence), is a professor of Criminal Law at the University of Naples, associated at the Ecole de Droit de la Sorbonne - Université Paris 1 and director of the research team "Internormativities in Criminal Law" at the Collège de France. He is Vice-President of SIDS (Société internationale de Défense sociale), of ARPE (Association de Recherches Pénales Européennes) of ISPAC (International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme). He has published extensively in the fields of European, Comparative and International Criminal Law. He is the author of more than one hundred scientific articles in several languages and has published eleven books in the area of European, International and Comparative Law.

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