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The Schlieffen Plan : International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I

By: Ehlert, Hans.
Contributor(s): Epkenhans, Michael | Gross, Gerhard P | Zabecki, David T.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Foreign Military Studies: Publisher: Lexington : The University Press of Kentucky, 2014Description: 1 online resource (597 p.).ISBN: 9780813147475.Subject(s): Germany -- History, Military -- 20th century | Military planning -- Germany | Schlieffen Plan | Schlieffen, Alfred, Graf von, 1833-1913 | Strategy | World War, 1914-1918 -- France | World War, 1914-1918 -- GermanyGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: The Schlieffen Plan : International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War IDDC classification: 940.4 | 940.40130943 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Front cover; Copyright; Contents; General Map Key; Introduction ; The Sword and the Scepter; The Moltke Plan; The Schlieffen Plan-A War Plan; There Was a Schlieffen Plan; "This Trench and FortressWarfare Is Horrible!"; PHOTOGRAPHS; The Military Planning of theAustro-Hungarian Imperialand Royal Army and theSchlieffen Plan; French Plan XVII; Russian Forces and theGerman Buildup at theOutbreak of World War I; The Southern Envelopment; The British Army, Its GeneralStaff, and the ContinentalCommitment, 1904-1914; Belgium; Appendix--Deplyment Plans, 1893-1914
Glossary of German MilitaryTerms and AcronymsContributors ; Index; Map/Case Kuhl II: Operations Map Calais-Cologne; Map/The 1914 Battles in Lorraine and in the Vosges Mountains; Map/Case Freytag II: Overview Map of Europe; Map/December 1905 Memorandum: Operational Overview Map
Summary: With the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the failure of the Reinsurance Treaty in the late nineteenth century, Germany needed a strategy for fighting a two-front war. In response, Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen produced a study that represented the apex of modern military planning. His Memorandum for a War against France, which incorporated a mechanized cavalry as well as new technologies in weaponry, advocated that Germany concentrate its field army to the west and annihilate the French army within a few weeks. For generations, historians have considered Schlieffen's writings to be the foundation of Germany's military strategy in World War I and have hotly debated the reasons why the plan, as executed, failed.In this important volume, international scholars reassess Schlieffen's work for the first time in decades, offering new insights into the renowned general's impact not only on World War I but also on nearly a century of military historiography. The contributors draw on newly available source materials from European and Russian archives to demonstrate both the significance of the Schlieffen Plan and its deficiencies. They examine the operational planning of relevant European states and provide a broad, comparative historical context that other studies lack. Featuring fold-out maps and abstracts of the original German deployment plans as they evolved from 1893 to 1914, this rigorous reassessment vividly illustrates how failures in statecraft as well as military planning led to the tragedy of the First World War.
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Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
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DD101.5 .S2613 2014 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1812950 Available EBL1812950

Front cover; Copyright; Contents; General Map Key; Introduction ; The Sword and the Scepter; The Moltke Plan; The Schlieffen Plan-A War Plan; There Was a Schlieffen Plan; "This Trench and FortressWarfare Is Horrible!"; PHOTOGRAPHS; The Military Planning of theAustro-Hungarian Imperialand Royal Army and theSchlieffen Plan; French Plan XVII; Russian Forces and theGerman Buildup at theOutbreak of World War I; The Southern Envelopment; The British Army, Its GeneralStaff, and the ContinentalCommitment, 1904-1914; Belgium; Appendix--Deplyment Plans, 1893-1914

Glossary of German MilitaryTerms and AcronymsContributors ; Index; Map/Case Kuhl II: Operations Map Calais-Cologne; Map/The 1914 Battles in Lorraine and in the Vosges Mountains; Map/Case Freytag II: Overview Map of Europe; Map/December 1905 Memorandum: Operational Overview Map

With the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the failure of the Reinsurance Treaty in the late nineteenth century, Germany needed a strategy for fighting a two-front war. In response, Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen produced a study that represented the apex of modern military planning. His Memorandum for a War against France, which incorporated a mechanized cavalry as well as new technologies in weaponry, advocated that Germany concentrate its field army to the west and annihilate the French army within a few weeks. For generations, historians have considered Schlieffen's writings to be the foundation of Germany's military strategy in World War I and have hotly debated the reasons why the plan, as executed, failed.In this important volume, international scholars reassess Schlieffen's work for the first time in decades, offering new insights into the renowned general's impact not only on World War I but also on nearly a century of military historiography. The contributors draw on newly available source materials from European and Russian archives to demonstrate both the significance of the Schlieffen Plan and its deficiencies. They examine the operational planning of relevant European states and provide a broad, comparative historical context that other studies lack. Featuring fold-out maps and abstracts of the original German deployment plans as they evolved from 1893 to 1914, this rigorous reassessment vividly illustrates how failures in statecraft as well as military planning led to the tragedy of the First World War.

Description based upon print version of record.

Author notes provided by Syndetics

<p> Hans Ehlert , Michael Epkenhans , and Gerhard P. Gross are historians at the Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw) in Potsdam, Germany.</p> <p> Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.) , is the author of The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War and editor in chief of the four-volume encyclopedia Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History . He is an honorary senior research fellow in the War Studies Programme at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.</p>

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