Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization : The President, the Senate, and Political Parties in the Making of House RulesMaterial type: TextSeries: eBooks on DemandPublisher: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2014Description: 1 online resource (214 p.)ISBN: 9781316079010Subject(s): Legislation -- United States | Separation of powers -- United States | United States. Congress. House | United States. Congress. House. -- Rules and practiceGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization : The President, the Senate, and Political Parties in the Making of House RulesDDC classification: 328.73 | 328.7307653 LOC classification: KF4990 .S57 2014Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
|Item type||Current location||Call number||URL||Status||Date due||Barcode|
|Electronic Book||UT Tyler Online Online||KF4990 .S57 2014 (Browse shelf)||http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1754902||Available||EBL1754902|
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|KF4944 The modern legislative veto :||KF4945 Pivotal Politics :||KF4945 .P37 2017 Politics over process :||KF4990 .S57 2014 Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization :||KF5050 .C35 2008 The unitary executive :||KF5050 .K58 2015 Reclaiming Accountability :||KF5051.G47 2013eb Forgotten Presidents :|
Cover; Half-title; Endorsement; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; List of figures and tables; Acknowledgments; 1 A Constitutional Perspective on House Organization; 2 Constitutional Actors and Intraparty Groups; Constitutional Actors; Intraparty Groups; Identifying Intraparty Groups; Majority Intraparty Groups within the Democratic and Republican Parties; Conclusion; 3 A Constitutional Theory of Legislative Organization; Theories and Models of Lawmaking in the United States; The Model: Explaining Changes in House Organization; The Power-Sharing Game
The Legislative GameStage 1: Bicameral Agreement; Stage 2: Constitutional Rules; Equilibrium Properties; Conclusion; 4 Timing of House Organizational Changes; Timing of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives; Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes: Empirical Implications; The Model's Implications for Timing: When Do House Members Adopt New Rules?; House Rules: Defining the Universe of Rules and Organizational Changes; Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes: Empirical Analysis; House Rule Changes, 1961; House Rule Changes, 1995-2013; House Rule Changes, 1879-2013
Conclusion5 The Senate and White House Shadows: Centralization and Decentralization...; The Directionality of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives; Theory: Explaining the Directionality of Rule Changes; Centralization of Power - Empowering the Speaker; Decentralization of Power - Revolting against One's Own Leader; Decentralization of Power - Empowering Outliers; Empirical Implications: The Directionality of Rule Changes; Empirical Analysis: Data and Measurement; Measuring the Positions of Constitutional Actors: House Factions, the Senate, and the President
Rules and the Distribution of Power within the Majority Party: Coding Centralization...Analysis; No Changes in CS; Change in CS and the Non-Speaker Group Gained an Ally (Allies) in the Senate and/or President...; Change in CS and Senate and President Move Closer to the Speaker Group (Non-Speaker Group Has No Outside Allies); Change in CS and the House Minority Party Gains Control of President and Senate; Multinomial Analysis; Conclusion; 6 New Rules for an Old Speaker: Revisiting the 1910 Revolt against Speaker Cannon; The Revolt against Speaker Cannon; Prevailing Interpretation of the Revolt
Is the Prevailing Interpretation Correct?Timing of the Revolt: Why Did the Progressives Revolt Only after Cannon Had Been Serving...; Why Not a Revolt before the 1909 CS Changes?; Regulation of Corporations; Conservation of Natural Resources Program; Social Welfare Acts; The Tariff Schedule; Why Did the Revolt Happen a Year after Taft's Election?; The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act; Taft's Program on Regulation and Conservation; Directionality of the Revolt; Presidential Change, Policy Differences, and Roll Call Data
Alternative Explanation: Cannon Was Most Autocratic during the Year prior to the Revolt
Examines how constitutional requirements of the lawmaking process, and the factional divisions within parties, affect US representatives' decisions on distributing power among themselves.
Description based upon print version of record.