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The Case Against Consequentialism Reconsidered.

By: Mukerji, Nikil.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Theory and Decision Library A: Publisher: Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2016Description: 1 online resource (265 p.).ISBN: 9783319392493.Subject(s): Consequentialism (Ethics)Genre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: The Case Against Consequentialism ReconsideredDDC classification: 100 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Illustrations -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Normative-Ethical Foundations -- 1.1 Normative Ethics -- 1.2 Moral Theories -- 1.2.1 The Theoretical Component -- 1.2.1.1 The Moral Status of Acts -- 1.2.1.2 Acts -- 1.2.1.3 Choice Situations -- 1.2.1.4 Agents -- 1.2.1.5 Normative Factors -- 1.2.2 The Practical Component -- 1.2.3 Some Distinctions Between Moral Theories -- 1.3 Summary -- 2 Metaethical Foundations -- 2.1 The Rawlsian Approach -- 2.2 Interpretations of the Rawlsian Approach -- 2.2.1 The Top-Down Approach
2.2.2 The Reflective-Equilibrium Approach -- 2.2.3 The Bottom-Up Approach -- 2.3 Provisional Fixed Points -- 2.4 Trolley Cases -- 2.4.1 Characteristics -- 2.4.2 Uses -- 2.4.3 Pros and Cons -- 2.5 Summary -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 The Definitional Method -- 3.1.1 The Definition of Consequentialism -- 3.1.2 The Humpty Dumpty Defence -- 3.2 The Family Resemblance Approach -- 3.2.1 The First Version -- 3.2.2 The Second Version -- 3.3 Summary -- 4 Consequentialism and Its Variants -- 4.1 Classic Utilitarianism -- 4.1.1 The Theoretical Component -- 4.1.2 The Practical Component -- 4.1.3 Characteristics
4.1.4 Motivation -- 4.2 Variants of Consequentialism -- 4.2.1 Unmotivated Variants -- 4.2.1.1 Subjective Consequentialism -- 4.2.1.2 Indirect Consequentialism -- 4.2.1.3 Alternative Theories of Well-Being -- 4.2.2 Non-Maximizing Variants -- 4.2.2.1 Motivation -- 4.2.2.2 Options -- 4.2.3 Alternative Welfarist Conceptions of the Good -- 4.2.3.1 Motivation -- 4.2.3.2 Options -- 4.2.4 Alternatives to Welfarism -- 4.2.4.1 Motivation -- 4.2.4.2 Options -- 4.3 Summary -- 5 Joining the Dots -- 5.1 The Case Against Classic Utilitarianism -- 5.2 Consequentialist Replies
5.2.1 Consequentialist Constraints -- 5.2.2 Slote's Comparative Satisficing -- 5.2.3 Hurka's Maxificing -- 5.2.4 Alternative Welfarist Conceptions of the Good -- 5.3 Summary -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Index
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Item type Current location Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
Online
BJ1031.M85 2016 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=4661624 Available EBL4661624

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Illustrations -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Normative-Ethical Foundations -- 1.1 Normative Ethics -- 1.2 Moral Theories -- 1.2.1 The Theoretical Component -- 1.2.1.1 The Moral Status of Acts -- 1.2.1.2 Acts -- 1.2.1.3 Choice Situations -- 1.2.1.4 Agents -- 1.2.1.5 Normative Factors -- 1.2.2 The Practical Component -- 1.2.3 Some Distinctions Between Moral Theories -- 1.3 Summary -- 2 Metaethical Foundations -- 2.1 The Rawlsian Approach -- 2.2 Interpretations of the Rawlsian Approach -- 2.2.1 The Top-Down Approach

2.2.2 The Reflective-Equilibrium Approach -- 2.2.3 The Bottom-Up Approach -- 2.3 Provisional Fixed Points -- 2.4 Trolley Cases -- 2.4.1 Characteristics -- 2.4.2 Uses -- 2.4.3 Pros and Cons -- 2.5 Summary -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 The Definitional Method -- 3.1.1 The Definition of Consequentialism -- 3.1.2 The Humpty Dumpty Defence -- 3.2 The Family Resemblance Approach -- 3.2.1 The First Version -- 3.2.2 The Second Version -- 3.3 Summary -- 4 Consequentialism and Its Variants -- 4.1 Classic Utilitarianism -- 4.1.1 The Theoretical Component -- 4.1.2 The Practical Component -- 4.1.3 Characteristics

4.1.4 Motivation -- 4.2 Variants of Consequentialism -- 4.2.1 Unmotivated Variants -- 4.2.1.1 Subjective Consequentialism -- 4.2.1.2 Indirect Consequentialism -- 4.2.1.3 Alternative Theories of Well-Being -- 4.2.2 Non-Maximizing Variants -- 4.2.2.1 Motivation -- 4.2.2.2 Options -- 4.2.3 Alternative Welfarist Conceptions of the Good -- 4.2.3.1 Motivation -- 4.2.3.2 Options -- 4.2.4 Alternatives to Welfarism -- 4.2.4.1 Motivation -- 4.2.4.2 Options -- 4.3 Summary -- 5 Joining the Dots -- 5.1 The Case Against Classic Utilitarianism -- 5.2 Consequentialist Replies

5.2.1 Consequentialist Constraints -- 5.2.2 Slote's Comparative Satisficing -- 5.2.3 Hurka's Maxificing -- 5.2.4 Alternative Welfarist Conceptions of the Good -- 5.3 Summary -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Index

Description based upon print version of record.

Author notes provided by Syndetics

<p>Nikil Mukerji is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (Munich, Germany). He studied Economics, Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Theory in Munich, Aberdeen (UK) and Auckland (NZ) and received his PhD in Philosophy from Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München in 2014. His research interests include Moral Philosophy, Informal Logic and Argumentation Theory, the Philosophy of Economics, Experimental Philosophy and Metaphilosophy more broadly. He is the author of two monographs ( Das Differenzprinzip und seine Realisierungsbedingungen , 2009 & Die zehn Gebote des gesunden Menschenverstandes , forthcoming) and has co-edited two volumes (Rethinking Responsibility in Science and Technology, 2014 & Order Ethics - An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy, forthcoming).</p>

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