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The Normative and the Natural.

By: Wolf, Michael P.
Contributor(s): Koons, Jeremy Randel.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Publisher: Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2016Description: 1 online resource (357 p.).ISBN: 9783319336879.Subject(s): Normativity (Ethics)Genre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: The Normative and the NaturalDDC classification: 100 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Dedication -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Introduction -- The Road from Here -- 1: Naturalist Themes -- 1.1 Naturalist Themes: Science, Ontology, Anti-Transcendentalism -- 1.1.1 Naturalism and the Priority of Scientific Methods -- 1.1.2 Naturalism as Ontological and Explanatory Conservatism -- 1.1.3 Naturalism as Anti-Transcendental -- 1.2 Why Should We Care about Whether We Are Naturalists? -- 1.2.1 Fallibilism and Methodological Modesty -- 1.2.2 Naturalism and Ontological Parsimony -- 1.2.3 Naturalism or Scientism? -- Notes -- References
2: Why Do We Need Normativity? -- 2.1 Science, Instrumental and  Non-­Instrumental Normativity -- 2.2 Scientific Progress and Epistemic Appraisal -- 2.3 The Normativity of Instrumental Reason -- 2.3.1 Reductive Accounts of Instrumental Normativity -- 2.3.2 Teleology and Instrumental Normativity -- 2.3.3 Normativity and Agency -- Notes -- References -- 3: Against Supervenience and Reductionist Accounts of Normativity -- 3.1 A Quick Stage-Setting Note: "Mere Aggregate" Properties -- 3.2 Reductionism1 -- 3.2.1 Normativity and the Meaning of Normative Expressions
3.2.2 Non-Semantic Normative Content -- 3.2.3 Practical Reason and Normativity -- 3.3 Against Supervenience Accounts of Normativity -- 3.3.1 Strong Supervenience and Normativity -- 3.3.2 Weak Supervenience and Normativity -- 3.3.3 Global Supervenience and Normativity -- 3.4 Eliminativism -- Notes -- References -- 4: Truth and Pluralism -- 4.1 Truth -- 4.1.1 How Not to Not Worry about Truth (Why We Are Not Internalists or Relativists) -- 4.1.2 Deflationist Accounts of Truth and Normative Discourse -- 4.1.3 A Preliminary Sketch of Truth-Apt Normative Content
4.1.4 Normative Discourse and Quantification -- 4.2 Moderate Discourse Pluralism -- Notes -- References -- 5: Interests, Embodiment, and Constraint by the World -- 5.1 Interests and Engagement with the World -- 5.2 Normativity, the Natural, Entanglement, and Layer Cakes -- 5.3 Varieties of Interests -- 5.3.1 Interests as Pragmatic, Rather Than Psychological -- 5.3.2 General Interests and Normative Theorizing -- Notes -- References -- 6: Action-Guiding Content -- 6.1 Action-Guiding Content -- 6.1.1 Normative Declarative Sentences and the Embedding Problem
6.1.2 Evaluating Normative Claims -- 6.1.3 A Botany of Action-Guiding Modes -- 6.2 "Good" and "Right" -- 6.2.1 The Open-Endedness of Goods-Talk -- 6.2.2 Quasi-Reification -- 6.2.3 A Last Note: "Right" and "Correct" and Expressions of Direction and Proscription -- Notes -- References -- 7: Objectivity and Normative Discourse -- 7.1 Normativity, Objectivity, and Relativism -- 7.2 Normativity within Social Practices -- 7.2.1 Normativity and Rule-Following -- 7.2.2 Truth without Truthmakers -- 7.3 Agents, Prescriptions, and Reasons -- 7.3.1 From Social Practices to Agency
7.3.2 Empirical Constraints On the Normative
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Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
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BJ1458.3.W65 2016 (Browse shelf) http://uttyler.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=4662190 Available EBL4662190

Dedication -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Introduction -- The Road from Here -- 1: Naturalist Themes -- 1.1 Naturalist Themes: Science, Ontology, Anti-Transcendentalism -- 1.1.1 Naturalism and the Priority of Scientific Methods -- 1.1.2 Naturalism as Ontological and Explanatory Conservatism -- 1.1.3 Naturalism as Anti-Transcendental -- 1.2 Why Should We Care about Whether We Are Naturalists? -- 1.2.1 Fallibilism and Methodological Modesty -- 1.2.2 Naturalism and Ontological Parsimony -- 1.2.3 Naturalism or Scientism? -- Notes -- References

2: Why Do We Need Normativity? -- 2.1 Science, Instrumental and  Non-­Instrumental Normativity -- 2.2 Scientific Progress and Epistemic Appraisal -- 2.3 The Normativity of Instrumental Reason -- 2.3.1 Reductive Accounts of Instrumental Normativity -- 2.3.2 Teleology and Instrumental Normativity -- 2.3.3 Normativity and Agency -- Notes -- References -- 3: Against Supervenience and Reductionist Accounts of Normativity -- 3.1 A Quick Stage-Setting Note: "Mere Aggregate" Properties -- 3.2 Reductionism1 -- 3.2.1 Normativity and the Meaning of Normative Expressions

3.2.2 Non-Semantic Normative Content -- 3.2.3 Practical Reason and Normativity -- 3.3 Against Supervenience Accounts of Normativity -- 3.3.1 Strong Supervenience and Normativity -- 3.3.2 Weak Supervenience and Normativity -- 3.3.3 Global Supervenience and Normativity -- 3.4 Eliminativism -- Notes -- References -- 4: Truth and Pluralism -- 4.1 Truth -- 4.1.1 How Not to Not Worry about Truth (Why We Are Not Internalists or Relativists) -- 4.1.2 Deflationist Accounts of Truth and Normative Discourse -- 4.1.3 A Preliminary Sketch of Truth-Apt Normative Content

4.1.4 Normative Discourse and Quantification -- 4.2 Moderate Discourse Pluralism -- Notes -- References -- 5: Interests, Embodiment, and Constraint by the World -- 5.1 Interests and Engagement with the World -- 5.2 Normativity, the Natural, Entanglement, and Layer Cakes -- 5.3 Varieties of Interests -- 5.3.1 Interests as Pragmatic, Rather Than Psychological -- 5.3.2 General Interests and Normative Theorizing -- Notes -- References -- 6: Action-Guiding Content -- 6.1 Action-Guiding Content -- 6.1.1 Normative Declarative Sentences and the Embedding Problem

6.1.2 Evaluating Normative Claims -- 6.1.3 A Botany of Action-Guiding Modes -- 6.2 "Good" and "Right" -- 6.2.1 The Open-Endedness of Goods-Talk -- 6.2.2 Quasi-Reification -- 6.2.3 A Last Note: "Right" and "Correct" and Expressions of Direction and Proscription -- Notes -- References -- 7: Objectivity and Normative Discourse -- 7.1 Normativity, Objectivity, and Relativism -- 7.2 Normativity within Social Practices -- 7.2.1 Normativity and Rule-Following -- 7.2.2 Truth without Truthmakers -- 7.3 Agents, Prescriptions, and Reasons -- 7.3.1 From Social Practices to Agency

7.3.2 Empirical Constraints On the Normative

Description based upon print version of record.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Wolf (Washington and Jefferson College) and Koons (Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service, Qatar) tackle one of the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy: the relationship between normativity (from the epistemic to the ethical) and naturalism. Following a broadly pragmatist vein, the authors' argument is innovative and thorough--at times even surprising and funny--without sacrificing rigor. In fact, the book's strengths are in the authors' articulation of their arguments and their charitable consideration of several main arguments against finding a place for the normative in a strictly natural world. Their early criticisms of eliminativism, reductionism, and supervenience are threaded throughout the rest of the argument in a way that shows genuine consideration for the difficulties of the overall problem. Though many arguments are technically demanding, readers will be well rewarded in the final chapters, which not only bring many argumentative threads together but also explicate through concrete examples from many fields of discourse. The authors' pragmatist inheritance and close reading of Wilfrid Sellars are on display throughout. Those interested in how facts and values relate within a naturalistic framework cannot ignore this book. Not everyone will agree, but all should be provoked. Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty. --Tibor Solymosi, independent scholar

Author notes provided by Syndetics

<p>Michael P. Wolf is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Washington and Jefferson College, US. He has published extensively in the philosophy of language and epistemology.</p> <p>Jeremy Randel Koons is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He has published widely in epistemology, metaethics, philosophy of religion, and other areas.</p>

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