Pivotal Politics : A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking

By: Krehbiel, KeithMaterial type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on DemandPublisher: Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2014Description: 1 online resource (276 p.)ISBN: 9780226452739Subject(s): Law -- Political aspects | Legislation -- United States | Separation of powers -- United StatesGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Pivotal Politics : A Theory of U.S. LawmakingDDC classification: 320.473 LOC classification: KF4945Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Contents -- Tables -- Figures -- Preface -- I. Theoretical Foundations -- I. Basics -- 2. A Theory -- II. Empirical Tests -- 3. Gridlock -- 4. Coalition Sizes -- 5. Filibuster Pivots -- 6. Veto Pivots -- III. Applications -- 7. Presidential Power? -- 8. Party Government? -- 9. Partisanship or Pivots? -- IV. Conclusion -- 10. Beyond Basics -- Bibliography -- Index
Summary: Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to legislative gridlock. Not so, argues Keith Krehbiel, who advances the provocative theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Meticulously researched and anchored to real politics, Krehbiel argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill a simple majority, but the vote that allows it
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Contents -- Tables -- Figures -- Preface -- I. Theoretical Foundations -- I. Basics -- 2. A Theory -- II. Empirical Tests -- 3. Gridlock -- 4. Coalition Sizes -- 5. Filibuster Pivots -- 6. Veto Pivots -- III. Applications -- 7. Presidential Power? -- 8. Party Government? -- 9. Partisanship or Pivots? -- IV. Conclusion -- 10. Beyond Basics -- Bibliography -- Index

Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to legislative gridlock. Not so, argues Keith Krehbiel, who advances the provocative theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Meticulously researched and anchored to real politics, Krehbiel argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill a simple majority, but the vote that allows it

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