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To Form A More Perfect Union : A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution.

By: McGuire, Robert A.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Publisher: Cary : Oxford University Press, 2014Copyright date: ©2003Description: 1 online resource (408 pages).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780195349931.Subject(s): Constitutional history -- United States | Constitutional law -- Economic aspects -- United States | Economic liberties (U.S. Constitution) | United States -- Economic conditions -- To 1865 | United States. -- Constitution -- Economic aspects | United States. -- Constitutional Convention -- (1787)Genre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: To Form A More Perfect Union : A New Economic Interpretation of the United States ConstitutionDDC classification: 342.73 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Contents -- Prologue: A New Economic Interpretation -- Chapter One: The Evolution of the Prevailing Interpretation -- Chapter Two: Economics and the Constitution -- Part I: The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 -- Chapter Three: The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution -- Chapter Four: Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution -- Chapter Five: The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution -- Part II: The Ratification of the Constitution, 1787-1790 -- Chapter Six: The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation -- Chapter Seven: The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions -- Epilogue: The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification -- Appendixes -- Appendix 1: Documents -- Appendix 2: The Data and their Sources -- Appendix 3: Full and Parsimonius Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention -- Appendix 4: Personal-Interest and Constituent-Interest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention -- Appendix 5: Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention -- Appendix 6: Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions -- Appendix 7: Voting Models for Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia Ratifying Conventions -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.
Summary: Prologue: A New Economic Interpretation 1. The Evolution of the Prevailing Interpretation 2. Economics and the Constitution Part I: The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 3. The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution 4. Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution 5. The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution Part II: The Ratification of the Constitution, 1787-1790 6. The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation 7. The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions Epilogue: The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification Appendixes Appendix 1: Documents Appendix 2: The Data and Their Sources Appendix 3: Full and Parsimonius Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention Appendix 4: Personal-Interest and Constituent-Interest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention Appendix 5: Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention Appendix 6: Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions Appendix 7: Voting Models for Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia Ratifying Conventions Notes References Index.
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Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
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KF4520 -- .M393 2003 (Browse shelf) http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uttyler/detail.action?docID=422664 Available EBC422664

Contents -- Prologue: A New Economic Interpretation -- Chapter One: The Evolution of the Prevailing Interpretation -- Chapter Two: Economics and the Constitution -- Part I: The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 -- Chapter Three: The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution -- Chapter Four: Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution -- Chapter Five: The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution -- Part II: The Ratification of the Constitution, 1787-1790 -- Chapter Six: The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation -- Chapter Seven: The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions -- Epilogue: The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification -- Appendixes -- Appendix 1: Documents -- Appendix 2: The Data and their Sources -- Appendix 3: Full and Parsimonius Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention -- Appendix 4: Personal-Interest and Constituent-Interest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention -- Appendix 5: Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention -- Appendix 6: Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions -- Appendix 7: Voting Models for Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia Ratifying Conventions -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.

Prologue: A New Economic Interpretation 1. The Evolution of the Prevailing Interpretation 2. Economics and the Constitution Part I: The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 3. The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution 4. Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution 5. The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution Part II: The Ratification of the Constitution, 1787-1790 6. The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation 7. The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions Epilogue: The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification Appendixes Appendix 1: Documents Appendix 2: The Data and Their Sources Appendix 3: Full and Parsimonius Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention Appendix 4: Personal-Interest and Constituent-Interest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention Appendix 5: Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention Appendix 6: Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions Appendix 7: Voting Models for Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia Ratifying Conventions Notes References Index.

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Author notes provided by Syndetics

Robert A. McGuire was born in Long Beach, California, and educated at Long Beach State and the University of Washington. A professor of economics at the University of Akron, he is the author of many studies that have appeared in academic journals, including the American Economic Review, American Journal of Political Science, Economic History Review, Journal of Economic History, and Public Choice. Among his most recent research is a study of the Confederate constitution appearing in Economic Inquiry and an ongoing study of the role of diseases in American economic history funded with a National Science Foundation grant in 2000.

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