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On Justifying Moral Judgements (Routledge Revivals).

By: Becker, Lawrence C.
Material type: TextTextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Routledge Revivals: Publisher: Florence : Taylor and Francis, 2014Copyright date: ©1973Description: 1 online resource (214 pages).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781317703273.Subject(s): Judgment (Ethics) | ValuesGenre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: On Justifying Moral Judgements (Routledge Revivals)DDC classification: 170 Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
Contents:
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- I Introduction -- 1 The Procedure Problem -- 2 The Grounding Problem -- 3 Philosophic Quagmires -- 4 The Ambiguity of Moral Judgment -- 5 An Overview -- II Axiology, Deontology and Agent Morality -- 1 Some Ordinary Assumptions -- 2 The Three Theories: Strengths and Weaknesses -- 3 The Uneliminability of Weaknesses -- 4 The Need for Co-ordination -- Notes -- III Values and Justification Procedure -- 1 The Approach to be Used -- 2 Some Cautions -- 3 Conditions to be Met by an Account of Valuation -- Notes -- IV Five Types of Valuation -- 1 Summary Valuations -- 2 Affective Valuations -- 3 Calculative Valuations -- 4 Good-of-its-kind Valuations -- 5 Fittingness Valuations -- 6 Two Objections -- Notes -- V More on Valuation -- 1 Comments on the Processes Involved in Valuing -- 2 The Independence of the Five Types of Valuation -- 3 Second Order Questions -- 4 Further Remarks on the Meanings of Value-Expressions -- Notes -- VI Evaluation -- 1 Preliminaries -- 2 The Ethical Neutralism of These Procedures -- 3 Well-Formed Valuations -- 4 Three Procedural Principles -- Notes -- VII Grounding Value Judgments -- 1 A Reprise of the Sceptic's Argument -- 2 The Difference between a Ground and a Proof -- 3 Presumptive Value Criteria -- 4 Some Loosely Metaphorical Comments on the Use of the Criteria -- 5 Some Objections -- 6 Summation -- Notes -- VIII Grounding Value Judgments (continued) -- 1 The 'Right' Thing to Do -- 2 Applying the Criteria -- 3 Some Reminders and Elaborations -- 4 Some Sources of Uneasiness -- Notes -- IX Matters of Moral Concern -- 1 Preliminaries -- 2 The Moral and the Non-Moral -- 3 Moral Judgments are Ones Requiring a Ground -- Notes -- X Grounding Deontic Judgments -- 1 From Is to Ought.
2 Presumptive Deontic Criteria -- 3 Putting the Two Procedures Together -- Notes -- XI Three Issues Concerning the Arguments so far -- 1 The 'Ceteris Paribus' Clause -- 2 Universalizability -- 3 Evidence to the Contrary -- Notes -- XII Why Be Moral? -- Notes -- XIII The Concept of Responsibility -- 1 Responsibility-Statements -- 2 Holding a Man Responsible -- 3 An Analysis of Attributive and Deontic R-statements -- Notes -- XIV Responsible Agency -- 1 Some Cases -- 2 Necessary Conditions of Responsible Agency -- 3 The Free Will Controversy -- 4 The Notion of Autonomy -- 5 The Intelligibility of Determinism -- Notes -- XV Avoiding the Free Will Issue -- 1 Two Aspects Not Interfered with by the Determinist's Thesis -- 2 The Aspect which Is Interfered with by the Determinist's Thesis -- 3 The Interference is a Rhetorical Problem -- 4 The Route Around the Free Will Problem -- Notes -- XVI Justifying Attributions of Responsibility -- 1 The Occasion for the Attribution -- 2 Persons Named in the Attribution -- Notes -- XVII Justifying Sanctions -- 1 Justifying Sanctions for Admitted Liability -- 2 Justifying Sanctions for Admitted Non-Liability -- Notes -- XVIII Justifying Ascriptions of Responsibility -- 1 Accepting Responsibility -- 2 Describing the Responsibility -- XIX Agent Morality: The Concepts of Justice and a Good Man -- 1 Justice -- 2 The Good Man -- 3 Presumptive Criteria for Assessing Moral Character -- Notes -- XX Concluding Remarks -- Index.
Summary: Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the 'is-ought' issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument.
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Item type Current location Call number URL Status Date due Barcode
Electronic Book UT Tyler Online
Online
BJ1408.5 -- .B435 2014 (Browse shelf) http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uttyler/detail.action?docID=1713531 Available EBC1713531

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- I Introduction -- 1 The Procedure Problem -- 2 The Grounding Problem -- 3 Philosophic Quagmires -- 4 The Ambiguity of Moral Judgment -- 5 An Overview -- II Axiology, Deontology and Agent Morality -- 1 Some Ordinary Assumptions -- 2 The Three Theories: Strengths and Weaknesses -- 3 The Uneliminability of Weaknesses -- 4 The Need for Co-ordination -- Notes -- III Values and Justification Procedure -- 1 The Approach to be Used -- 2 Some Cautions -- 3 Conditions to be Met by an Account of Valuation -- Notes -- IV Five Types of Valuation -- 1 Summary Valuations -- 2 Affective Valuations -- 3 Calculative Valuations -- 4 Good-of-its-kind Valuations -- 5 Fittingness Valuations -- 6 Two Objections -- Notes -- V More on Valuation -- 1 Comments on the Processes Involved in Valuing -- 2 The Independence of the Five Types of Valuation -- 3 Second Order Questions -- 4 Further Remarks on the Meanings of Value-Expressions -- Notes -- VI Evaluation -- 1 Preliminaries -- 2 The Ethical Neutralism of These Procedures -- 3 Well-Formed Valuations -- 4 Three Procedural Principles -- Notes -- VII Grounding Value Judgments -- 1 A Reprise of the Sceptic's Argument -- 2 The Difference between a Ground and a Proof -- 3 Presumptive Value Criteria -- 4 Some Loosely Metaphorical Comments on the Use of the Criteria -- 5 Some Objections -- 6 Summation -- Notes -- VIII Grounding Value Judgments (continued) -- 1 The 'Right' Thing to Do -- 2 Applying the Criteria -- 3 Some Reminders and Elaborations -- 4 Some Sources of Uneasiness -- Notes -- IX Matters of Moral Concern -- 1 Preliminaries -- 2 The Moral and the Non-Moral -- 3 Moral Judgments are Ones Requiring a Ground -- Notes -- X Grounding Deontic Judgments -- 1 From Is to Ought.

2 Presumptive Deontic Criteria -- 3 Putting the Two Procedures Together -- Notes -- XI Three Issues Concerning the Arguments so far -- 1 The 'Ceteris Paribus' Clause -- 2 Universalizability -- 3 Evidence to the Contrary -- Notes -- XII Why Be Moral? -- Notes -- XIII The Concept of Responsibility -- 1 Responsibility-Statements -- 2 Holding a Man Responsible -- 3 An Analysis of Attributive and Deontic R-statements -- Notes -- XIV Responsible Agency -- 1 Some Cases -- 2 Necessary Conditions of Responsible Agency -- 3 The Free Will Controversy -- 4 The Notion of Autonomy -- 5 The Intelligibility of Determinism -- Notes -- XV Avoiding the Free Will Issue -- 1 Two Aspects Not Interfered with by the Determinist's Thesis -- 2 The Aspect which Is Interfered with by the Determinist's Thesis -- 3 The Interference is a Rhetorical Problem -- 4 The Route Around the Free Will Problem -- Notes -- XVI Justifying Attributions of Responsibility -- 1 The Occasion for the Attribution -- 2 Persons Named in the Attribution -- Notes -- XVII Justifying Sanctions -- 1 Justifying Sanctions for Admitted Liability -- 2 Justifying Sanctions for Admitted Non-Liability -- Notes -- XVIII Justifying Ascriptions of Responsibility -- 1 Accepting Responsibility -- 2 Describing the Responsibility -- XIX Agent Morality: The Concepts of Justice and a Good Man -- 1 Justice -- 2 The Good Man -- 3 Presumptive Criteria for Assessing Moral Character -- Notes -- XX Concluding Remarks -- Index.

Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the 'is-ought' issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument.

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