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Undermining the Kremlin : America's strategy to subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 / Gregory Mitrovich.

By: Mitrovich, Gregory, 1964-.
Material type: TextTextSeries: Cornell studies in security affairs: Publisher: Ithaca, [N.Y.] : Cornell University Press, c2000Description: x, 235 p. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 0801437113 (cloth); 9780801437113 (cloth).Subject(s): United States -- Military policy | National security -- United States -- History -- 20th century | Cold War | United States -- Foreign relations -- Communist countries | Communist countries -- Foreign relations -- United StatesDDC classification: 327.1273/047/09045 LOC classification: UA23 | .M58 2000Other classification: 15.85
Contents:
Introduction: The Origins of Postwar U.S. National Security Policy -- Defining an Offensive Strategy, 1948-1949 -- Intensifying the Offensive: Atomic Weapons, Strategic Uncertainty, and NSC 68, 1950-1951 -- Redefining Policy: Charles Bohlen and the Retrenchment of 1952 -- Liberation, Coexistence, or Annihilation: U.S. Policy in the Era of the Hydrogen Bomb, 1953-1956 -- Conclusion: America's Cold War Objectives.
Review: "Drawing on recently declassified U.S. documents, Mitrovich reveals a range of previously unknown covert actions launched during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Through the aggressive use of psychological warfare, officials sought to provoke political crisis among key Soviet leaders, to incite nationalist tensions within the USSR, and to foment unrest across Eastern Europe. Mitrovich demonstrates that inspiration for these efforts did not originate within the intelligence community, but with individuals at the highest levels of policymaking in the U.S. government."--BOOK JACKET.
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Item type Current location Call number Status Date due Barcode
Book University of Texas At Tyler
Stacks - 3rd Floor
UA23 .M58 2000 (Browse shelf) Available 0000001811991

Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-229) and index.

Introduction: The Origins of Postwar U.S. National Security Policy -- Defining an Offensive Strategy, 1948-1949 -- Intensifying the Offensive: Atomic Weapons, Strategic Uncertainty, and NSC 68, 1950-1951 -- Redefining Policy: Charles Bohlen and the Retrenchment of 1952 -- Liberation, Coexistence, or Annihilation: U.S. Policy in the Era of the Hydrogen Bomb, 1953-1956 -- Conclusion: America's Cold War Objectives.

"Drawing on recently declassified U.S. documents, Mitrovich reveals a range of previously unknown covert actions launched during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Through the aggressive use of psychological warfare, officials sought to provoke political crisis among key Soviet leaders, to incite nationalist tensions within the USSR, and to foment unrest across Eastern Europe. Mitrovich demonstrates that inspiration for these efforts did not originate within the intelligence community, but with individuals at the highest levels of policymaking in the U.S. government."--BOOK JACKET.

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Mitrovich has written a solid account of US national security policy toward the Soviet Union during the Truman and Eisenhower eras. Using primarily American sources, the author shows that the US conducted psychological warfare against the Soviet Bloc with the intention of stimulating the East Europeans and diverse national groups within the Soviet Union to overthrow the communists through revolutionary action. When nuclear war made it too dangerous to foment revolution, the US pursued its goals through the acceptance of peaceful coexistence, which eventually allowed the inherent contradictions of the Soviet political-economic system to produce the evolutionary transformation of the Gorbachev years. There is nothing truly new about the author's arguments or evidence although he presents the case clearly and concisely, but his claim that American policy from Stalin to Gorbachev transformed the Soviet Bloc is hardly convincing. The problem is threefold: the evolution of the Soviet Bloc was never guaranteed; American policy from Kennedy to Reagan was hardly consistent with the policy of Truman and Eisenhower; and, finally, American policy was not the primary cause of Soviet distress, distortion, and, ultimately, implosion. The book has a useful bibliography and index. Upper-division undergraduates and above. D. J. Dunn; Southwest Texas State University

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Gregory Mitrovich received a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Southern California

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