Technology and the Law on the Use of Force : New Security Challenges in the Twenty-First Century.
By: Maogoto, Jackson.Material type: TextSeries: eBooks on Demand.Routledge Research in International Law: Publisher: London : Taylor and Francis, 2014Copyright date: ©2015Description: 1 online resource (130 pages).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781134445509.Subject(s): Computer networks -- Security measures | Cyberterrorism -- Prevention | Information warfare (International law) | Malware (Computer software) -- Prevention | War (International law)Genre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: Technology and the Law on the Use of Force : New Security Challenges in the Twenty-First CenturyDDC classification: 341.6 LOC classification: KZ6718 -- .M364 2015Online resources: Click here to view this ebook.
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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Dedication -- Acknowledgements -- List of acronyms -- Table of cases -- Table of statutes -- Introduction -- 1 Use of force: displaced twentieth-century rules, norms and standards? -- Introduction -- The concept of armed attack -- Article 51: the State's right to respond in self-defence -- The restrictionist approach -- The counter-restrictionist approach -- The UN Charter challenged: shades of legal grey -- The UN Charter: generalities revisited -- Conclusion -- 2 Revolution in military affairs: hi-tech weaponry, low-tech legal safeguards -- Introduction -- The fourth domain: outer space -- The fifth domain: cyber space -- Conclusion -- 3 The fourth domain: ascendance of outer space as a war theatre -- Introduction -- 'Peaceful': easy understanding or difficult enunciation -- The intersection of the UN Charter regime on force and Outer Space Law -- Closing the loop? Network centric warfare matures -- The Outer Space Treaty -- The Limited Test Ban Treaty -- The Liability Convention -- The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- Weaponisation and militarisation of outer space revisited -- Conclusion -- 4 War in the fifth domain: cyberwarfare -- Introduction -- Cyberattacks: classifications and analytical models -- The colours of cyber interruptions and disruptions -- Cyber conflict along the spectrum of armed attack -- Smokeless warfare: worms, viruses and trojans -- Information warfare: colliding or colluding with the regime on the use of force? -- Physical destruction: is data property? -- Electronic blockades: new perception or old shackles -- Small-scale or large-scale attacks: reflections on quantitative evaluation -- Specific targeting of military facilities: any difference -- Conclusion -- 5 Discarding law by analogy: old legal frameworks for new threats -- Introduction.
Outer space: addressing a clear and present danger -- Resolving the 'peaceful purposes' conundrum: disengaging legal shadows from operational substance -- Re-orientating the peace and security framework -- Coercive arms control -- The International Environmental Law Platform -- Cyber space: act now not later -- Refocusing on the principle of non-intervention -- A conclusive multilateral framework? -- Rethinking legal thresholds for information warfare -- Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.
As governmental and non-governmental operations become progressively supported by vast automated systems and electronic data flows, attacks of government information infrastructure, operations and processes pose a serious threat to economic and military interests. In 2007 Estonia suffered a month long cyber assault to its digital infrastructure, described in cyberspace as 'Web War I'. In 2010, a worm-Stuxnet-was identified as supervisory control and data acquisition systems at Iran's uranium enrichment plant, presumably in an attempt to set back Iran's nuclear programme. The dependence upon telecommunications and information infrastructures puts at risk Critical National Infrastructure, and is now at the core of national security interests. This book takes a detailed look at these new theatres of war and considers their relation to international law on the use of force. Except in cases of self-defence or with the authorisation of a Security Council Resolution, the use of force is prohibited under the UN charter and customary international law. However, the law of jus ad bellum was developed in a pre-digital era where current technological capabilities could not be conceived. Jackson Maogoto asks whether the law on the use of force is able to deal with legal disputes likely to arise from modern warfare. Key queries include how one defines an armed attack in an age of anti-satellite weaponry, whether the destruction of a State's vital digital eco-system or the "blinding" of military communication satellites constitutes a threat, and how one delimits the threshold that would enliven the right of self-defence or retaliatory action. The book argues that while technology has leapt ahead, the legal framework has failed to adapt, rendering States unable to legally defend themselves effectively. The book will be of great interest and use to researchers
and students of international law, the law of armed conflict, Information Technology and the law, and counter-terrorism.
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